Presentation: Theory of mind
The following presentation reviews empathy and theory of mind.
You are not expected to learn all of the material in this presentation. When using this study for revision, remember to:
- Focus on key concepts
- Learn 2 - 3 studies that you are feel you understand. You may also, instead, learn studies from the textbook or from your teacher.
- Focus on key evaluation points
It is based on grounded theory - Piaget’s theory of early childhood cognitive development, with the corresponding behaviour observed during the belief-desire stage and Piaget’s pre-operational stage. This could be explained through schema development.
It is supported by empirical research.
It explains how an understanding of the minds of others develop as children test their acquired ‘meta-representations’ (general schemas) regarding the world around them. It thus allows prediction of the level of development of theory of mind according to a child’s age.
Just as Hughes was able to show that if a task is familiar, then egocentrism is lost at an earlier age than Piaget predicted (at 4 years old, rather than older), so Baren-Cohen’s Sally-Anne task has been criticised for ambiguity of language by Siegal and Beattie (1991). They demonstrated that with clearer questioning, children under 4 years old were able to show theory of mind. So it may be language development that underpins theory of mind, rather than schema development.
It is unfalsifiable. It assumes underlying schemas are responsible for the development of theory of mind in children, but this cannot be directly tested.
Mirror neuron research using fMRI scans supports the theory that empathy is activated by observing the actions and emotions of others and matching them to our own actions and emotions. Therefore, this seems to give an observable and valid biological basis for empathy and the development of theory of mind.
It can also be used to explain the failure of children under 4 years old on the Sally-Anne task, by arguing that younger children are unable to simulate another person whose view differs from their own.
It does not explain how we know the mind of others, just how we presume to know the minds of others, providing they are similar to our own.It explains empathy, but not our understanding of others who have different responses from our own.
The evidence of fMRIs just shows brain activity in the relevant region that correlates to an observed action. It is reductionist to take this as explaining empathy.