“1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam and organising international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel, or in instructors except for the purpose of effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base at the disposition of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilised for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

6. The Conference recognises that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member states of the International Supervisory Commission referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from April 20th 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to insure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow every one in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons’ families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to insure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected

Ideological: consider the anti-Communist speeches of the Presidents, the domestic red-scare within the, USA, the impact of the cold war in Europe and previous events in Asia - all of which affected how the US saw Ho Chi Minh and blinded the US to the nationalist aims of Ho Chi Minh

Economic: consider the point made by Eisenhower in his Domino Theory speech

Strategic; consider the idea of the Domino Theory - that all US Presidents believed that  if Vietnam fell to Communism so would other countries within Asia

VC tactics were effective because:

they seized weapons in small scale engagements where their superior position and superior numbers would give the assurance of easy victories (90% o f their weapons seized from Saigon or US forces up to 1964)

They relied on surprise attacks and lethal booby traps

They cut most of the roads leading to Saigon so that political liaison between the capital and the villages was effectively broken

There was a tight organization; new recruits joined a 3 person cell attached in turn to a 3 cell squad which worked tightly together on military operations

They followed a 12 point code to show respect to local communities

Every soldier was encourage to know what his/her role was; they were given political training and self-criticism was encouraged

Even when they were supported with weapons from the North down the Ho Chi Minh Trail allowing them to do more large scale attacks, guerilla tactics continued throughout

The guerillas could always choose targets and accept or reject combat at will

They used the tunnel system extensively

Their knowledge of the terrain and the support of the local people remained essential to their strength and success

They carried out political education in the villages

They were ruthless against opponents assassinating or kidnapping officials who were working for the Saigon government

In much of South Vietnam, the NLF became the only government operating its own schools, hospitals etc

The VC maintained a viable economy in the areas they controlled; they collected taxes and revenues from commerce

They reorganised the villages economically; they encouraged villages to set up village organisations which controlled taxes and planned defense

The bombing of North Vietnam meant that the North got increasingly involved in the fight against the US so that by 1967 virtually all first line combat troops of the VC were provided with modern Chinese and Soviet weaponry

The bombing raids in the North also failed ot have any serious impact on the rural economy and failed to break the morale of the North

Search and destroy tactics alienated the local population but were also ineffective in allowing the Americans to hold land; they could clear land of VC in the day but when they returned to their bases at night the VC could return

Defoliation through Agent Orange further alienated the local population; thousands of refugees were created through US tactics. As Tabor writes, 'to oppose the guerilla tactics, the American tactics were compelled to destroy the very country they were fighting for...every battle meant the attrition of native support and the creation of a new VC'. (Tabor: The War of the Flea)

The US faced the problems of fighting an enemy who knew the territory, had the support of the local population and was mostly indistinguishable from the local population

The US also faced the problem of supporting a government in the south which was ineffective and corrupt. Diem's nine successors were all corrupt and oppressive and failed to improve public support or to improve the fighting quality of the AVRN which was very poor.

Time was on the side of the Vietnamese; the American government could only maintain public and Congress support for a limited time for a war that they were clearly not winning.

The Vietnamese were fighting a total war mobilising all their resources to fight the US; the US was trying to fight a limited war and so was never put on a war footing. There was a lack of unity and co-ordination within the American military machine

The extent of public opposition at home further made it difficult for the US to continue the war. There had been no declaration of war by the US on North Vietnam and there was a lack of unity within the country. there was no media censorship and the images on TV about the suffering of the Vietnamese further eroded public support for the war

The US never understood the nature of the Vietnamese conflict (see McNamara video on this above). the Americans were involving themselves in a civil war in a country that had fought against foreign domination for centuries; the Americans were portrayed as foreign aggressors and the Vietcong were able to portray themselves as liberators from foreign rule