| Date | May 2022 | Marks available | 9 | Reference code | 22M.1.BP.TZ0.12 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Discuss | Question number | 12 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source I An extract from a US government proposal delivered to the Empire of Japan on 26 November 1941, “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan.” (Known as “The Hull Note”.)
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor [try] to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.
Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement in which each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territory of French Indochina.
The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, or economically any Government or regime in China other than the national Government of the Republic of China.
[Source: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941. United States Note to Japan, “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan”, 26 November 1941. Available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Hull_note [Accessed 09 March 2021]. Source adapted.]
Source K Harry A Gailey, a professor of military history, in the academic book The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (1995).
The [Japanese] army representatives were unanimous [united] in demanding war with the United States. [General] Tojo [the Japanese Prime Minister] understood that Japan’s … [limited] oil supply, combined with the notorious bad weather, would make the Pearl Harbor attack almost impossible if postponed past the target date of …( 7 December Hawaii time) …
While high-level Japanese officials had been confronting the hard choices of peace or war and their armed forces were preparing for conflict, … [the Americans] seemed … [completely] unaware of the potential consequences of President Roosevelt’s embargo … Again and again [US Secretary of State] Hull … insisted upon a complete Japanese withdrawal from both China and Indochina. Perhaps the [earlier] proposed meeting between … [the US and Japan would have settled nothing, as Hull claimed. But America refused even to negotiate].
As early as his first meeting with … [the Japanese Ambassador] on 8 March, Hull was … [concerned] that his policy might lead to war with the Japanese. Later it was obvious … that only a Japanese withdrawal from China would have … [prevented] war.
Perhaps it is too much to say, in retrospect, that anyone in the US government wanted war with Japan, but obviously little was done to … [prevent] it. At the same time that the hard-line diplomatic policy was being pursued, there was … [a lack of action] at all levels in Washington and Honolulu.
[Source: Excerpt(s) from WAR IN THE PACIFIC: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO BAY by Harry A. Gailey, copyright
© 1995 by Harry A. Gailey. Used by permission of Presidio Press, an imprint of Random House, a division of
Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.]
Source L David J Lu, a professor of Japanese history, writing in the academic book From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Entry into World War II (1961).
General Tojo later explained that the decision to attack was adopted in view of the tense international situation due to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. American and British preparations for war, difficulties in the negotiations with the United States, and no clear means of settling the China Incident also contributed. It was therefore necessary to prepare for war and yet continue the diplomatic conversations. The deadline for the negotiations was set because November would be the best month for landing operations. December would be possible but difficult, January would be impossible because of the northeast monsoons. Japan wanted the United States to express its views regarding three major points of difference between the two governments: (1) the withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan’s commitments under the Tripartite Pact, and (3) equal access to international trade. Japan avoided specific commitments on all major issues, and so did the United States. In Japanese eyes, the United States Government was not willing to give the specific answers that Japan was looking for. Thus, negotiations were getting nowhere.
[Source: Lu, D.J., 1961. From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Entry into World War II. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press. pp. 201, 207–8. Source adapted.]
Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the reasons for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.
Indicative content
Source I The terms of the proposed agreement contained measures that would be completely unacceptable to the Japanese government, heightening tensions.
Source K The intransigent nature of United States policy led to a failure of negotiations. United States government demands were unacceptable to the Japanese government, and this hastened Japan’s military preparations.
Source L The decision to attack Pearl Harbor was a consequence of international economic sanctions. Difficulties in the negotiations with the United States and no clear means of settling the China Incident led to the attack. In Japanese eyes, the United States Government was not willing to negotiate. The weather also acted as a catalyst for the timing of the attack.
Own knowledge Candidates may discuss United States–Japanese relations prior to 1941, such as the response of the United States to the Manchurian Crisis, tensions with regard to Japan’s war with China from 1937, subsequent support for the Chinese government, and the impact of the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The abandonment of the Strike North option by Japan led to a focus on the Pacific. Candidates could also discuss the rift in policy decision making within Japan, the importance of Japanese public opinion and the changing role of the military as Japan became more authoritarian in the lead up to Pearl Harbor. Candidates could also contend that the Hull Note of 26 November 1941 was a deliberate provocation, so that the United States could enter the war. However, other factors such as the weakness of the League of Nations, and in the short-term the Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR, may have encouraged Japanese expansionism.
Examiners report
Many candidates provided a focused and developed response to the final question. It was pleasing to find that most candidates demonstrated a sound understanding of the question and attempted to refer to source content in their analysis. There were some excellent essay-style responses which, for example, discussed the reasons for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, discussed the view that Ibrahim Rugova's methods contributed to the origins of the war in Kosovo or evaluated the significance of Nelson Mandela to the struggle against apartheid up to 1964. However, as noted above, some responses to the final question were too brief or clearly incomplete apparently due to the candidate not reserving sufficient time for the final question. Although well informed, others were excessively descriptive in nature, requiring the examiner to infer the relevance of such information to the set question. Most candidates referred to at least one source, but many did not include relevant knowledge. A sizeable minority tended to list the content of each source with a general point addressing the question at the end. On the other hand, there were candidates who did not refer to the sources at all in their response.
Candidates should be reminded that for the top markband responses must maintain focus on the set question and clearly reference and use the sources as evidence to support the analysis. In addition, for the final question there must be synthesis of accurate and relevant own knowledge.
