| Date | May 2022 | Marks available | 6 | Reference code | 22M.1.BP.TZ0.11 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Compare and contrast | Question number | 11 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source K Harry A Gailey, a professor of military history, in the academic book The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (1995).
The [Japanese] army representatives were unanimous [united] in demanding war with the United States. [General] Tojo [the Japanese Prime Minister] understood that Japan’s … [limited] oil supply, combined with the notorious bad weather, would make the Pearl Harbor attack almost impossible if postponed past the target date of …( 7 December Hawaii time) …
While high-level Japanese officials had been confronting the hard choices of peace or war and their armed forces were preparing for conflict, … [the Americans] seemed … [completely] unaware of the potential consequences of President Roosevelt’s embargo … Again and again [US Secretary of State] Hull … insisted upon a complete Japanese withdrawal from both China and Indochina. Perhaps the [earlier] proposed meeting between … [the US and Japan would have settled nothing, as Hull claimed. But America refused even to negotiate].
As early as his first meeting with … [the Japanese Ambassador] on 8 March, Hull was … [concerned] that his policy might lead to war with the Japanese. Later it was obvious … that only a Japanese withdrawal from China would have … [prevented] war.
Perhaps it is too much to say, in retrospect, that anyone in the US government wanted war with Japan, but obviously little was done to … [prevent] it. At the same time that the hard-line diplomatic policy was being pursued, there was … [a lack of action] at all levels in Washington and Honolulu.
[Source: Excerpt(s) from WAR IN THE PACIFIC: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO BAY by Harry A. Gailey, copyright
© 1995 by Harry A. Gailey. Used by permission of Presidio Press, an imprint of Random House, a division of
Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.]
Source L David J Lu, a professor of Japanese history, writing in the academic book From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Entry into World War II (1961).
General Tojo later explained that the decision to attack was adopted in view of the tense international situation due to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. American and British preparations for war, difficulties in the negotiations with the United States, and no clear means of settling the China Incident also contributed. It was therefore necessary to prepare for war and yet continue the diplomatic conversations. The deadline for the negotiations was set because November would be the best month for landing operations. December would be possible but difficult, January would be impossible because of the northeast monsoons. Japan wanted the United States to express its views regarding three major points of difference between the two governments: (1) the withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan’s commitments under the Tripartite Pact, and (3) equal access to international trade. Japan avoided specific commitments on all major issues, and so did the United States. In Japanese eyes, the United States Government was not willing to give the specific answers that Japan was looking for. Thus, negotiations were getting nowhere.
[Source: Lu, D.J., 1961. From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Entry into World War II. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press. pp. 201, 207–8. Source adapted.]
Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.
Comparison:
- Both sources identify that the economic embargo on Japan was significant.
- Both sources indicate that the negotiations between the United States and Japan were not successful.
- Both sources indicate that the vital issue to be resolved was the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.
- Both sources suggest the significance of weather in the planning of the attack.
Contrast:
- Source K suggests that only the Japanese were preparing for war, whereas Source L refers to American and British preparations for war.
- Source K suggests that the embargo was imposed only by the United States, whereas Source L states that economic sanctions were an international response.
Examiners report
There has been continued improvement in terms of candidates adopting an appropriate approach to the compare and contrast question. Indeed, a notable number of candidates achieved full marks for this question. The majority had attempted both comparisons and contrasts and had explained the links between the sources clearly. Most candidates were able to identify at least one comparison, for example for Question 11) that both sources find the economic embargo on Japan as significant and for Question 15) that both sources highlight Mandela's role in the establishment of the MK. However, there were some responses that only offered one or two linkage points and a few described each source in end-on accounts without clearly identifying a similarity or difference. Some candidates also described the provenance of each source. Candidates should be reminded that more than one comparison and one contrast are required to attain the top markband, for example two comparisons and two contrasts with development (although there need not be an equal number of each).
