| Date | November 2017 | Marks available | 9 | Reference code | 17N.1.BP.TZ0.12 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | To what extent | Question number | 12 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source I
An extract from a Japanese government statement, “The Fundamental Principles of National Policy” (August 1936).
(1) Japan must strive to eradicate [eliminate] the aggressive policies of the great powers …
(3) … in order to promote Manchukuo’s healthy development and to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense, the threat from the north, the Soviet Union, must be eliminated; in order to promote our economic development, we must prepare against Great Britain and the United States and bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In the execution of this policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.
(4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economic development in the South Seas, especially in the outlying South Seas area. She plans to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful means without arousing other powers. In this way, concurrently with the firm establishment of Manchukuo, Japan must expect full development and strengthening of her national power.
[Source: Republished with permission of Taylor & Francis Group LLc Books, from Japan: a Documentary
History, David J. Lu, 1996; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc]
Source J
William Beasley, a professor of the history of the Far East, writing in the academic book Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (1987).
Central to the basic propositions was the intention that Japan … must establish cordial [friendly] relations with the peoples of the area founded on the principles of co-existence and co-prosperity. It would also undertake economic expansion on its own account by creating a strong coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and China and by extending its interests in South-East Asia in gradual and peaceful ways. There were some conditions. The army must be given forces in Korea and Kwantung [Guandong] sufficient to deal with any attack from Soviet Russia. The navy must have a fleet capable of maintaining ascendancy in the west Pacific against that of the United States.
Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] cooperation, designed to detach Nanking [Nanjing] from its communist affiliations [links], though highly desirable must not be allowed to stand in the way of treating north China as a “special region” to be brought into close relationship with Japan and Manchukuo. It was, for example, to provide strategic materials, in order to strengthen their defences against the Soviet Union. As to the south, a gradual and peaceful approach was intended to avert fears in countries of the area concerning Japanese aims …
From the point of view of the ministers in Tokyo, none of this was meant to bring about territorial expansion. They still thought in terms of informal empire, that is, of securing an increase in Japan’s privileges through pressure exerted on Asian governments, including that of China.
[Source: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 1894-1945 by William Beasley (1987)
p.202. By permission of Oxford University Press]
Source K
Hans van de Ven, a professor of modern Chinese history, writing in the academic book War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945 (2003).
By 1933, Japan’s military strategy aimed at defending itself against the Soviet Union, China and the British and American navies. Massive investment programmes in the heavy, chemical, and machinery industries followed to give Japan the industrial base to sustain itself in time of war, and also of course to deal with the problems of the Depression. In 1936, Japan stepped up its military expenditures when a new cabinet accepted the build-up of national strength as Japan’s highest priority …
Japan therefore developed a strategic doctrine aimed at defending Japan by aggressive offensive operations of limited duration, to be concluded before its major enemies could concentrate their forces in East Asia. To defeat China before such a war was part of this strategy. Worried about war with the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the “removal of China”, as the aggressive General Tojo stated in a telegram from Manchuria to Tokyo in early 1937, would eliminate “an important menace from our rear” and release forces for service on more critical fronts. If the military build-up and the political influence of the army in Japanese politics were causes for worry in China, so were the expansionist tendencies of the Kwantung [Guandong] Army in Manchuria.
[Source: From: War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945, Hans van de Ven, 2003,
Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]
Source L
John Bernard Partridge, an illustrator and cartoonist, depicts Japan threatening China in an untitled cartoon for the British magazine Punch (21 July 1937).
Note: The word on the tail is Manchukuo.
S.O.S.
Chinese dragon: I say, do be careful with that sword! If you try to cut off my head
I shall really have to appeal to the League again.
[Source: PUNCH Magazine Cartoon Archives www.punch.co.uk]
Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the suggestion that Japanese foreign policy aims up to 1937 were to be achieved through “gradual and peaceful ways” (Source J)?
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.
Indicative content
Source I
Asserts that the great powers, in particular the Soviet Union, had aggressive policies that were a threat to Japan. However, it also indicates that Japan’s relationship with the other powers should be developed through “friendly relations.”
Source J
Indicates that Japanese relations with other peoples in the area would be based on coexistence and co-prosperity. Any interests in South-East Asia must be based on a non-aggressive policy based on a peaceful approach. It also shows that the ministers in Tokyo were not interested in territorial expansion through force but by exerting pressure on governments in Asia.
Source K
Maintains that an industrial base would be needed in case of war and that aggressive offensive operations of a short duration were necessary and would necessitate the elimination of China militarily. Military action would also be necessary against the Soviet Union.
Source L
Shows that the Japanese had aggressive intentions towards China and were threatening to annex it, as they had already done with Manchukuo. It suggests that Japan would not be afraid to use military force.
Own knowledge
By 1931, after the invasion of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army simply ignored efforts by the Imperial government in Tokyo to check its aggression. Militarists assassinated Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932, for trying to bring the Kwantung Army under control. By 1933 Jehol had been annexed and Manchukuo created under the puppet leader Pu Yi.
By the mid-1930s, army extremists had become impatient with Japan's existing political and economic policies that led to the attempted coup on 26 February 1936. Although the coup failed militarists were committed to extending Japanese territory by force.
The signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936 was seen as protecting Manchukuo against the Soviet Union and guaranteeing the safety of Japanese territory allowing for a more aggressive policy towards China.
In July 1937, tensions between Chinese troops and Japanese troops led to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident after which Japanese armies invaded China’s northern provinces and quickly captured Beijing. The Japanese captured Shanghai in November 1937 and then attacked Nanjing in December 1937 with the resulting massacre of the civilian population.
