Source J

William Beasley, a professor of the history of the Far East, writing in the academic book Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (1987).

Central to the basic propositions was the intention that Japan … must establish cordial [friendly] relations with the peoples of the area founded on the principles of co-existence and co-prosperity. It would also undertake economic expansion on its own account by creating a strong coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and China and by  extending its interests in South-East Asia in gradual and peaceful ways. There were some conditions. The army must be given forces in Korea and Kwantung [Guandong] sufficient to deal with any attack from Soviet Russia. The navy must have a fleet capable of maintaining ascendancy in the west Pacific against that of the United States.

Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] cooperation, designed to detach Nanking [Nanjing] from its communist affiliations [links], though highly desirable must not be allowed to stand in the way of treating north China as a “special region” to be brought into close relationship with Japan and Manchukuo. It was, for example, to provide strategic materials, in order to strengthen their defences against the Soviet Union. As to the south, a gradual and peaceful approach was intended to avert fears in countries of the area concerning Japanese aims …

From the point of view of the ministers in Tokyo, none of this was meant to bring about territorial expansion. They still thought in terms of informal empire, that is, of securing an increase in Japan’s privileges through pressure  exerted on Asian governments, including that of China.

[Source: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 1894-1945 by William Beasley (1987)
p.202. By permission of Oxford University Press]

Source K

Hans van de Ven, a professor of modern Chinese history, writing in the academic book War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945 (2003).

By 1933, Japan’s military strategy aimed at defending itself against the Soviet Union, China and the British and American navies. Massive investment programmes in the heavy, chemical, and machinery industries followed to give Japan the industrial base to sustain itself in time of war, and also of course to deal with the problems of the Depression. In 1936, Japan stepped up its military expenditures when a new cabinet accepted the build-up of national strength as Japan’s highest priority …

Japan therefore developed a strategic doctrine aimed at defending Japan by aggressive offensive operations of limited duration, to be concluded before its major enemies could concentrate their forces in East Asia. To defeat China before such a war was part of this strategy. Worried about war with the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the “removal of China”, as the aggressive General Tojo stated in a telegram from Manchuria to Tokyo in early 1937, would eliminate “an important menace from our rear” and release forces for service on more critical fronts. If the military build-up and the political influence of the army in Japanese politics were causes for worry in China, so were the expansionist tendencies of the Kwantung [Guandong] Army in Manchuria.

[Source: From: War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945, Hans van de Ven, 2003,
Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]