| Date | May 2017 | Marks available | 9 | Reference code | 17M.1.BP.TZ0.12 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | To what extent | Question number | 12 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source K
Chihiro Hosoya, a Japanese professor of history, writing in the article “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: US-Japanese Relations, 1938–1941”, for the academic publication Journal of Peace Research (1968).
According to a US public opinion survey of late September [1941], the number of Americans favouring strong action against Japan had greatly increased. Furthermore, Roosevelt stated on 12 October that the United States would not be intimidated. The Tripartite Pact had worsened relations with the United States. Japanese army officers demanded an acceleration of southern expansion. Even before the Tripartite Pact, Japan had demanded permission to move troops into southern Indochina and did so on 28 July. The Japanese pressures on Indochina led the US government to freeze Japanese assets in the United States and to impose an embargo against Japan. Officers in the Japanese navy were resolved to go to war because of the oil embargo. They were anxious about the existing supply of oil turning the Japanese navy into a “paper navy” [powerless navy].
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source I
Andrew Gordon, a US historian, writing in the book A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003).
When Japan moved into northern Indochina, the US responded with a gradually expanding export embargo. This provoked some sections of the Japanese military to argue for a pre-emptive strike against the United States and its allies. Japan followed this by extending their hold over Indochina, gaining Vichy permission to occupy the entire peninsula in July 1941 [‘Vichy’ refers to the government of the French state between 1940 and 1944]. The agreement left Japan as the virtual ruler of the French colony.
The Americans countered this advance with a strong and threatening move. Roosevelt immediately pulled together an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil supplies to Japan. He also offered military supplies to China. Without oil Japan could not sustain its military or economy. It faced a difficult choice. It could agree to American conditions for lifting the embargo by retreating completely from China. Or it could take control of the Southeast Asian oil fields by force and negotiate for a ceasefire from that strengthened position.
For a time, it pursued both courses. Japanese diplomats sought in vain to negotiate a formula for a partial retreat in China that might satisfy both their own reluctant army and the United States. The Japanese military, meanwhile, drew up plans for an attack that might force the Western powers to recognize its hegemony in Asia.
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source J
Osami Nagano, Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at the Imperial Conference, 6 September 1941.
Based on the assumption that a peaceful solution has not been found and war is inevitable, the Empire’s oil supply, as well as the stockpiles of many other important war materials, is being used up day by day with the result that the national defence power is gradually diminishing. If this deplorable situation is left unchecked, I believe that, after a lapse of some time, the nation’s strength will diminish.
On the other hand, the defence of military installations and key points of Britain, the United States and other countries in the Far East, as well as military preparations of these nations, particularly those of the United States, are being strengthened so quickly that by next year we will find it difficult to oppose them. Therefore, wasting time now could be disastrous for the Empire. I believe that it is imperative [essential] for the Empire that it should first make the fullest preparations and lose no time in carrying out positive operations with firm determination, in order that it can find a way out of the difficult situation.
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source L
David Low, a cartoonist, depicts Japanese expansion in the cartoon “Enough in the tank to get to that filling station?” in the British newspaper The Evening Standard (8 August 1941). The sign on the side of the building is “Dutch E. [East] Indies and on the vehicle it is “Jap. [Japanese] Oil Reserves.
“Mutual fear led to increasing tensions between the US and Japan.” Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement?
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.
Indicative content
Source I The fact that Japanese diplomats were considering a partial withdrawal from China could indicate their fear of the US. Japan's plans for a pre-emptive strike against the US and its allies may be interpreted by some candidates as evidence that the Japanese did not fear to provoke war against the US. Roosevelt's decision to impose an oil embargo on Japan may be interpreted as a response to US fear of Japanese hegemony in Asia.
Source J The Japanese military interpreted US and British defence of their military installations as a threat to Japanese security. It also feared the strengthening of US and British military preparations if war was postponed. Japan feared the depletion of its own resources.
Source K The source suggests that the US did not fear Japan as Roosevelt claimed he would not be intimidated by Japan. This is supported by the reference to US citizens increasingly supporting strong action against Japan. Also, the signing of the Tripartite Pact did not deter the US. Japanese officers feared that the embargo could turn the Japanese navy into a “paper navy”. This implies it could cease to be seen as a threat by the US and its allies.
Source L It depicts the Japanese, ready to use military force because they were worried about the oil reserves.
Own knowledge
Candidates may argue that the US became increasingly fearful of Japan with the invasion of Manchuria (1931) and the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. Although at the time US response was limited to moral denunciation, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 increased fears for US national security. Additionally, the Japanese naval expansion and the sinking of the American gunboat USS Panay (1937) contributed to the escalation of tensions. Japan's intention to implement the “Southern advance” and to mobilize bombers to attack Burma, Malaya and possibly the Philippines raised alarm in the US. Also, Japan feared the increasing involvement of the US in the Sino-Japanese War, such as financial and military aid to the Guomindang (GMD) was prolonging the war and pushing the Japanese economy to the limit. Candidates may offer additional material on economic factors, such as the negative impact on Japan's economy of the US protective tariffs or Roosevelt's decision in 1939 not to renew the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. These contributed to a negative perception of the US and to the rise of Japanese nationalism.
Candidates may also argue that it was not only mutual fear that increased tensions between the US and Japan and refer to the fear of Soviet influence in China. The US began to move away from its isolationist policy more openly after 1938 and by late 1941 some perceived the war against Japan as inevitable. Candidates may also refer to the failure of diplomatic negotiations (such as the US rejection of a partial Japanese withdrawal from China; the Hull note), the rise of Japanese militarism, Japanese alliances with Germany and Italy and the influence on Japan of Nazi victories in Europe.
