| Date | May 2017 | Marks available | 6 | Reference code | 17M.1.BP.TZ0.11 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Compare and contrast | Question number | 11 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source I
Andrew Gordon, a US historian, writing in the book A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003).
When Japan moved into northern Indochina, the US responded with a gradually expanding export embargo. This provoked some sections of the Japanese military to argue for a pre-emptive strike against the United States and its allies. Japan followed this by extending their hold over Indochina, gaining Vichy permission to occupy the entire peninsula in July 1941 [‘Vichy’ refers to the government of the French state between 1940 and 1944]. The agreement left Japan as the virtual ruler of the French colony.
The Americans countered this advance with a strong and threatening move. Roosevelt immediately pulled together an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil supplies to Japan. He also offered military supplies to China. Without oil Japan could not sustain its military or economy. It faced a difficult choice. It could agree to American conditions for lifting the embargo by retreating completely from China. Or it could take control of the Southeast Asian oil fields by force and negotiate for a ceasefire from that strengthened position.
For a time, it pursued both courses. Japanese diplomats sought in vain to negotiate a formula for a partial retreat in China that might satisfy both their own reluctant army and the United States. The Japanese military, meanwhile, drew up plans for an attack that might force the Western powers to recognize its hegemony in Asia.
The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Source J
Osami Nagano, Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at the Imperial Conference, 6 September 1941.
Based on the assumption that a peaceful solution has not been found and war is inevitable, the Empire’s oil supply, as well as the stockpiles of many other important war materials, is being used up day by day with the result that the national defence power is gradually diminishing. If this deplorable situation is left unchecked, I believe that, after a lapse of some time, the nation’s strength will diminish.
On the other hand, the defence of military installations and key points of Britain, the United States and other countries in the Far East, as well as military preparations of these nations, particularly those of the United States, are being strengthened so quickly that by next year we will find it difficult to oppose them. Therefore, wasting time now could be disastrous for the Empire. I believe that it is imperative [essential] for the Empire that it should first make the fullest preparations and lose no time in carrying out positive operations with firm determination, in order that it can find a way out of the difficult situation.
Compare and contrast what Sources I and J reveal about the increasing tensions between the US and Japan.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.
Indicative content
Comparisons:
- Both sources show Japan was dependent on foreign oil supplies.
- Both sources suggest that the Japanese military was prepared to go to war against the US.
- Both sources show that a diplomatic solution was unlikely, for example, because of forceful US responses such as imposing the oil embargo.
Contrasts:
- Source I claims that in 1941 the Japanese were still deciding between agreeing to US conditions in China or using force whereas Source J claims war might be difficult to avoid by then.
- Source I suggests Japan was acting aggressively to obtain resources whereas Source J claims it was also responding to the military preparations and strengthening of the defences of Britain and the US in the Far East.
- Source I states the Japanese diplomats and the Japanese military had opposing views as to how to address relations with the US whereas Source J does not suggest the existence of conflicting views among the Japanese authorities.
