Source A

FP Walters, a member of the League of Nations Secretariat (1919–1940), writing in an academic book, A History of the League of Nations (1952).

The first consequence of the invasion of Abyssinia had been an unexpected rally of the members of the League. It was their declared purpose to bring such pressure on Italy as would force her to make peace with Abyssinia on terms consistent with the Covenant (the charter of the League of Nations). If they succeeded in that aim the Covenant would have become the effective guarantee of world peace … But the Hoare-Laval Pact, which broke the unity and confidence of the League action was, for the Nazis, a signal that the way was clear for further advance. It [the pact] marked the weakness and division of France and Britain … During January and February 1936 there were many indications of growing sympathy between Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, the German press was filled with attacks on the Franco-Russian Treaty and the rumour grew that Hitler’s next objective was to get rid of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland.

Source B

Anthony Eden, who had been the British Foreign Secretary during the Abyssinian Crisis, writing in his autobiography The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (1962).

The Abyssinian conflict had highlighted the working [operations], scope and limitations of the League of Nations. From its earliest days there had been two views of the League’s purpose. Some considered that its function was to merely provide opportunities for statesmen to meet and resolve their differences by discussion, as best they might. Others, including myself, believed that the League, if it were to be a force in the world’s politics, must take decisive action against law-breakers. The British Government had moved between conciliation and firmness in their dealings with Mussolini in 1935. Now it was clear that firmness was more likely to bring results, the League was so physically and morally sick that its strength would have to be rebuilt before it could be used, if ever it could be used at all.

Source C

Christopher Culpin, a history teacher and author, and Ruth Henig, an academic historian, writing in a book for students, Modern Europe 1870–1945 (1997).

Neither France nor Britain was willing to engage in military hostilities with Italy on behalf of the League of Nations. France wanted Italian support for an anti-German alliance. Britain was facing the prospect of Japanese hostility in the Far East and the threat of an aggressive Germany in Europe … While the government in Britain pledged itself [promised] to uphold the authority of the League in the general election of 1935, it then tried to negotiate a compromise deal with Mussolini, which would have given him much of the Abyssinian territory he wanted, through the Hoare-Laval Pact. However, a public protest in Britain against the Pact forced the British and French to abandon it … Thus the Abyssinian dispute revealed, as had the Manchurian crisis earlier, that the leading League powers were not prepared to enforce the Covenant against another major League power who was not directly threatening their own interests … Thus ironically the only outcome of the League’s limited attempts to combat Italian aggression over Abyssinia was to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler.

Source D

John Bernard Partridge, an illustrator, depicts from left to right, the Abyssinian emperor Haile Selassie with Laval, Hoare and Mussolini, in the cartoon “The Sweets [rewards] of Aggression”, from the British satirical magazine Punch (18 December 1935).

Haile Selassie. “HAVE I GOT THIS RIGHT?—HE’S TAKEN NEARLY HALF OF WHAT I HAD AND NOW YOU GENTLEMEN WANT TO DISCUSS WHETHER HE SHOULD TAKE ANY MORE!”

Source E

Brian McKercher, a professor of history, writing in the academic essay “The Foreign Office, 1930–1939: Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security” for the journal Contemporary British History (2004).

In the twelve months following May 1935, Italian relations with Britain and France worsened, partly as a result of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact and, in the next month, with the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement. More significantly, in October 1935, Italian forces invaded Abyssinia, and there developed a major crisis so that, when the war ended, Italy had become separated from its Stresa partners. Britain wanted a settlement between Mussolini and Haile Selassie, the Abyssinian emperor, whilst safeguarding firm Anglo-Italian ties. When the crisis erupted, the British Foreign Office understood that bloodshed in Abyssinia could negatively affect the European, Mediterranean and Far Eastern balances of power.