| Date | November 2016 | Marks available | 6 | Reference code | 16N.1s1a.BP.TZ0.3 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 (Peacemaking, peacekeeping—international relations 1918–36) - last exams 2016 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Assess | Question number | 3 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source B
Anthony Eden, who had been the British Foreign Secretary during the Abyssinian Crisis, writing in his autobiography The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (1962).
The Abyssinian conflict had highlighted the working [operations], scope and limitations of the League of Nations. From its earliest days there had been two views of the League’s purpose. Some considered that its function was to merely provide opportunities for statesmen to meet and resolve their differences by discussion, as best they might. Others, including myself, believed that the League, if it were to be a force in the world’s politics, must take decisive action against law-breakers. The British Government had moved between conciliation and firmness in their dealings with Mussolini in 1935. Now it was clear that firmness was more likely to bring results, the League was so physically and morally sick that its strength would have to be rebuilt before it could be used, if ever it could be used at all.
Source C
Christopher Culpin, a history teacher and author, and Ruth Henig, an academic historian, writing in a book for students, Modern Europe 1870–1945 (1997).
Neither France nor Britain was willing to engage in military hostilities with Italy on behalf of the League of Nations. France wanted Italian support for an anti-German alliance. Britain was facing the prospect of Japanese hostility in the Far East and the threat of an aggressive Germany in Europe … While the government in Britain pledged itself [promised] to uphold the authority of the League in the general election of 1935, it then tried to negotiate a compromise deal with Mussolini, which would have given him much of the Abyssinian territory he wanted, through the Hoare-Laval Pact. However, a public protest in Britain against the Pact forced the British and French to abandon it … Thus the Abyssinian dispute revealed, as had the Manchurian crisis earlier, that the leading League powers were not prepared to enforce the Covenant against another major League power who was not directly threatening their own interests … Thus ironically the only outcome of the League’s limited attempts to combat Italian aggression over Abyssinia was to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler.
With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the values and limitations of Source B and Source C for historians studying the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
Markscheme
Source B
Origin: Anthony Eden, former Foreign Secretary of Britain, in his autobiography published in 1962.
Purpose: The book expresses Eden’s view on interwar British foreign policy.
Value: Eden was Foreign Secretary at the time and a key critic of the Hoare-Laval negotiations. It has the benefit of hindsight.
Limitations: The memoirs were written over 25 years after the event. Eden might be attempting to portray his actions in a more favourable light.
Source C
Origin: Christopher Culpin, a history teacher and author, and Ruth Henig, an academic historian, in a book for students published in 1997.
Purpose: To provide a general overview of European History up to 1945.
Value: Published in 1997 it will have hindsight; it will be well-researched with possible access to declassified documents. Henig is renowned in the field.
Limitations: It is a book for students and therefore may not have depth of analysis. It covers 75 years of European History and may not provide much information on the Abyssinian invasion.
Do not expect all of the above. Ideally there will be a balance between the two sources, and each one can be marked out of [3], but allow a [4/2] split. If only one source is assessed, mark out of [4]. For a maximum of [6] candidates must refer to both origin and purpose, and value and limitations in their assessment.
[6 marks]
