| Date | May 2022 | Marks available | 9 | Reference code | 22M.1.BP.TZ0.20 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Discuss | Question number | 20 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source Q Ibrahim Rugova, President of Kosovo from March 2002 until his death in 2006, testifying before the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (3 May 2002).
The first objective of this party [Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)] was to establish democracy in Kosovo, to start a democratic life for all its citizens. It aimed to give Kosovo a republic status equal to the other republics in the former Federation, because, as I said, Kosovo had been stripped of its autonomy. Then [after the 1991 referendum] we were striving to build an independent Kosovo — with rights for all its citizens. This was the main and initial goal, but the main thing was to defend the Kosovar people who were endangered at that time …
Our position was that independence should be achieved by peaceful, diplomatic, and democratic methods and violence should not be used …
The LDK started organizing solidarity actions to help people who were left without jobs, people who were dismissed from their jobs. It also organized society at large, keeping education and health and other areas of life going, such as culture and sport. And at that time, we also started collecting a tax, not a compulsory tax, but what we called a “solidarity tax”. It mainly concentrated on helping people with food, clothing and things that they needed, because people who had worked for years were now homeless and could not earn a living.
[Source: United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, PROSECUTOR vs. SLOBODAN
MILOŠEVIĆ, CASE IT-02-54, Testimony of Ibrahim Rugova in IT-02-54-T (ICTY), 3 May 2002.]
Source R Photograph of Ibrahim Rugova (centre) with United States envoy, Richard Holbrooke, (right) and British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Brian Donnelly, (left) in Pristina (10 October 1998).
[Source: Reuters, 1998. Ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova (center) holds hands with U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Brian Donnelly in Pristina on October 10, 1998. [photograph] (Reuters) Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/2247709.html [Accessed 03 March 2021].]
Source S Louis Sell, a professor of International Studies, writing in the academic book Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (2002).
Rugova possessed an iron [strong] determination to resist Serbian oppression. His choice of nonviolent tactics came from a desire to avoid the bloodshed that would accompany any effort to oppose the Serbs through violent means. Rugova himself described his approach as “a war without arms [weapons].” …
[However] Rugova’s mistake was in believing in the international community too much and especially the United States—which had a special relationship with Kosovo because of its early support for human rights in the province … Rugova and his Kosovo Albanian supporters experienced delay and disappointment. Once war broke out in the rest of Yugoslavia, Kosovo virtually disappeared from the media and the focus of international peace negotiators. Only when Kosovo Albanians had finally decided “enough is enough” and begun to shoot back at their Serb oppressors, did the international community refocus on Kosovo. By then it was too late for a peaceful solution.
[Source: Louis Sell, “Milosevic Takes Kosovo”, in Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, pp. 66-94.
Copyright 2002, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Republished by permission of the copyright holder, and the Publisher. www.dukeupress.edu.
Ibrahim Rugova, La question du Kosovo. Fayard, 1994. p. 126.]
Source T David L Phillips, a university professor, writing in the academic book Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention (2012).
Plans to set up a U.S. Information Center in Pristina were announced on January 9, 1996 … “This is a historic day for Kosovo,” said Ibrahim Rugova. “We are for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem based on the political will of its people …” Rugova maintained that this was a major diplomatic success for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in internationalizing the Kosovo issue and gaining recognition … The establishment of the U.S. Information Center was a clear result of the LDK’s internationalization strategy. However, it did not silence Rugova’s critics. The head of the Kosovo Students Union stated, “We thought that the LDK was too passive. It relied too much on international factors. Rugova created the illusion that the international community would resolve the crisis and that independence would come as a gift.” Kosovo Albanians were losing faith in the international community. An increasing number became radicalized as social and economic conditions deteriorated and human rights conditions worsened. It became less likely that their political objectives would be achieved by peaceful means.
[Source: Phillips, David L. foreword by Nicholas Burns., Liberating Kosovo, pp. 66-67 (adapted for exam), © 2012 David L.
Phillips, by permission of The MIT Press.]
Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that Ibrahim Rugova’s methods contributed to the origin of war in Kosovo.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.
Indicative content
Source Q Suggests Serbian responsibility for the origin of conflict as Rugova and the LDK proposed peaceful, diplomatic, and democratic methods, which sought to avoid conflict.
Source R Rugova’s methods to oppose Serbian oppression were diplomatic and nonviolent. Nonetheless, his policy of having western powers involved may be considered a cause of conflict.
Source S Rugova’s strategy of internationalizing the conflict failed, leading to the radicalization of Kosovo Albanians, who took arms after years of oppression.
Source T Although describing Rugova’s methods as nonviolent, the source suggests that Rugova’s lack of progress was responsible for the radicalization of Kosovo Albanians. Still, it also acknowledges other factors that contributed to radicalization including deteriorating economic and human rights conditions.
Own knowledge Candidates can argue that Rugova’s definition of the conflict as a humanitarian crisis (rather than an intra-state conflict over borders and minority rights) justified NATO intervention. Candidates may also propose that Rugova’s stubbornness and intransigence pushed former LDK members into the KLA ranks, and that a lack of progress during 1990–1998 led many in the Albanian diaspora to channel funds to the guerrilla group. Candidates can challenge the question, arguing that Rugova’s actions were not significant catalysts of war: candidates can discuss his policy of passive resistance in further detail, claiming that Rugova expected to attain independence through peaceful means. Candidates can argue that the causes for war actually lay elsewhere. They may analyse the effects of Milosevic's oppressive policies and systematization of violence, fueled by his nationalism and need to maintain power in a context of economic deterioration after the UN imposed economic sanctions. Candidates can also refer to Albania's economic breakdown; the KLA’s guerrilla campaign through 1998; or diplomatic failures at Rambouillet as significant factors that contributed to the origin of war.
Examiners report
Many candidates provided a focused and developed response to the final question. It was pleasing to find that most candidates demonstrated a sound understanding of the question and attempted to refer to source content in their analysis. There were some excellent essay-style responses which, for example, discussed the reasons for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, discussed the view that Ibrahim ted to the origins of the war in Kosovo or evaluated the significance of Nelson Mandela to the struggle against apartheid up to 1964. However, as noted above, some responses to the final question were too brief or clearly incomplete apparently due to the candidate not reserving sufficient time for the final question. Although well informed, others were excessively descriptive in nature, requiring the examiner to infer the relevance of such information to the set question. Most candidates referred to at least one source, but many did not include relevant knowledge. A sizeable minority tended to list the content of each source with a general point addressing the question at the end. On the other hand, there were candidates who did not refer to the sources at all in their response.
Candidates should be reminded that for the top markband responses must maintain focus on the set question and clearly reference and use the sources as evidence to support the analysis. In addition, for the final question there must be synthesis of accurate and relevant own knowledge.
