| Date | November 2020 | Marks available | 6 | Reference code | 20N.1.BP.TZ0.11 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Compare and contrast | Question number | 11 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
Source K Martin Clark, an historian, writing in the academic book Mussolini (2014).
The Italians had invaded Abyssinia in the 1890s and had suffered a humiliating defeat at Adowa in 1896 … Mussolini’s great ambition was to establish an African empire and the obvious place was Abyssinia, virtually the only part of Africa left uncolonized … The British and French would not be too offended, providing their interests were safeguarded, since they too suffered from Abyssinian border raids and would welcome greater security for their own neighbouring colonies. Mussolini had domestic reasons too. He needed to maintain morale at home, especially among the young. He could hardly keep proclaiming his warlike values and the need for Empire for over a decade, without actually fighting anybody. Mussolini needed a war: a quick, easy war against carefully chosen, weak opponents. So he set his sights on Abyssinia. As early as 1925 he ordered military and diplomatic preparations in case Abyssinia collapsed. On 30 December 1935, he finally issued orders for the total conquest of Abyssinia … [This] was not popular with the army high command. It was about to begin military talks with the French, and did not want to risk alienating its new partners; nor did it want to see all the available resources being swallowed up by a pointless colonial campaign.
[Source: Reproduced from Mussolini, 1st Edition by Keith Robbins, published by Routledge. © Pearson Education Limited,
2005, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]
Source L John Pollard, an historian, writing in the academic book The Fascist Experience in Italy (1998).
Mussolini believed that Fascism demanded a spectacular foreign policy achievement and the only one that would suffice [be enough] was the conquest of Abyssinia. But while the invasion was launched in 1935, it is clear that the decision to go to war was actually made in 1932, when Italy was still suffering the worst effects of the Depression. Thus, the traditional view that the Abyssinian adventure was almost certainly planned, at least in part, as an alternative to social reform still has some force. The resort to colonial adventures as a way of distracting attention from domestic difficulties, and even hopefully resolving them, was an established tradition among the Italian political class before the arrival of Fascism … thus Mussolini’s proposed conquest had the additional attraction of offering to wipe out the humiliation of Italy’s defeat by the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. In any case Abyssinia, as one of the two surviving independent states in Africa, was the only realistic place for further Italian colonial expansion. [By 1935] Italy was now more than a junior partner to Britain and France: it was Mussolini’s judgement that Italy had instead become their absolutely indispensable ally.
[Source: Reproduced from FASCIST EXPERIENCE IN ITALY, 1st Edition by John Pollard, published by Routledge.
© 1998, John Pollard, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]
Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about Mussolini’s policies towards Abyssinia.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.
Comparisons:
- Both sources see Mussolini’s invasion as being a reaction to the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896.
- Both sources identify Abyssinia as being one of the few territories left as a target for colonization in Africa by Mussolini.
- Both sources claim that Britain and France were unlikely to intervene.
- Both sources indicate that Mussolini was facing difficulties domestically and that a successful war was needed to help support his position as leader of Italy.
Contrasts:
- Source K identifies 1925 as the date by which Mussolini had decided on military preparations for war, whereas Source L states that the decision to go to war was made far later in 1932.
- Source L is more explicit about Mussolini using the invasion as a response to the Depression, whereas Source K sees the invasion as being Mussolini’s need to maintain morale at home.
Examiners report
There was continued improvement in the approach by candidates to the third question this session. The majority attempted to identify comparisons and contrasts, and in line with the requirements of the question, wrote a running commentary of similarities and differences. Indeed, it was pleasing to find that responses offered several valid similarities and differences. Candidates should be made aware that for the top markband, more than two developed linkage points between the sources should be established, for example two developed comparisons and two developed contrasts.
Some responses lacked clarity and/or development; points of comparison and contrast should have clear reference to the source content. A minority of candidates wrote accounts that described the content of each source without explicitly identifying comparisons and contrasts.
