The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Responses: international response to German aggression (1933–1938).

Source I

Notes for the British Cabinet on conversations held in Berlin between John
Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor
and Führer (March 1935).

John Simon thanked the Chancellor for the opportunity he had had of meeting him and for the way in which the British Ministers had been welcomed. But, observing the rule of frankness to the end, he must say that the British Ministers felt somewhat disappointed that it had not been possible to get a larger measure of agreement. They regretted that such difficulties were thought to exist on the German side in connection with some of the matters discussed. He did not regret having come to Berlin. He was sure that this meeting was the best way of continuing this investigation into the various points of view. What he regretted was that they had not been able to do more in the direction of promoting the general agreement which he was sure both sides wanted.

It showed that these things were more difficult and complicated than many believed them to be from a distance…

Hitler was also grateful to the British Government for the loyal efforts they had made in the matter of the Saar vote, and for all the other matters on which they had adopted such a loyal and generous attitude to Germany.

[Source: contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.]

Source J

Bernard Partridge, a cartoonist, depicts Adolf Hitler and John Simon in the
cartoon “Prosit!” [Cheers!] in the British satirical magazine Punch (27 March
1935). The wording on the tankard is “Conscription” and in the caption it is:

Herr Hitler: “The more we arm together the peacefuller [more peaceful] we’ll be!”
Sir John Simon: “Well—er—up to a certain point—and in certain cases—
provisionally—perhaps.”

[Source: Punch Cartoon Library / TopFoto]

Source K

Christian Leitz, an historian specializing in the Third Reich, writing in the academic book Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1941. The Road to Global War (2004).

Hitler’s quest to rearm Germany continued unopposed. During Anglo–French talks in London at the beginning of February (1935), Germany’s rearmament had received the blessing of the two West European powers even though they still hoped to convince Germany to join a multilateral Locarno-style pact guaranteeing the borders of Germany’s East European neighbours.

Hitler’s answer to these conciliatory approaches came quickly. He removed one of the major limitations of the Versailles Treaty and, on 16 March 1935, increased the size of Germany’s armed forces to 300,000 troops. This time, however, France, Britain and Italy seemed keen to react more firmly to the worrying growth in Germany’s strength. At Stresa in April, an attempt was made to establish a common front against Germany’s increasing attempts to revise [post-war settlements].

However, the reaction of the three former allies remained meek [feeble]. To the delight of the Nazi regime, the common front against Germany was both short lived and of limited impact. By June, Britain broke with Stresa when it agreed to a bilateral naval agreement with Germany.

[Source: reproduced from NAZI FOREIGN POLICY 1933 – 1941, 1st Edition by Christian Leitz, published by Routledge.
© Routledge Christian Leitz, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source L

Henri Lichtenberger, a university lecturer, writing in the academic book The Third Reich (1937).

Confronted by the German desire for naval rearmament, England [Britain], after a brief suggestion of displeasure, quickly decided to come to terms. British leaders believed that the best way to safeguard this primary English [British] interest would be to conclude a direct and separate agreement with Germany which would set a maximum limit to German armaments acceptable to both countries. In agreeing to this transaction Germany not only received the right to begin, with English consent, an important programme of naval construction, but also potentially caused further disagreement among the signatories of the Versailles Treaty.

The naval agreement signed in London on June 18, 1935 between England and Germany aroused great concern in France. It was the occasion for outbursts in the press and for diplomatic manoeuvres intended to moderate the disagreement which had unexpectedly developed between the two allied nations, and hold together the Entente which was considered valuable. It was nevertheless obvious that by his bold initiative, Hitler had scored an amazing success which also strengthened his prestige in Germany. He had won the right to rearm officially both on land and on sea and this was accomplished without a violent break with France.