| Date | May 2019 | Marks available | 6 | Reference code | 19M.1.BP.TZ0.3 |
| Level | Both SL and HL | Paper | Paper 1 - first exams 2017 | Time zone | TZ0 |
| Command term | Compare and contrast | Question number | 3 | Adapted from | N/A |
Question
The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 — Leadership: rise to power; uniting of rival tribes.
Source B
George Lane, a professor of the history of the Middle East and central Asia, writing in the academic book Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule (2004).
Temujin felt insecure knowing that one great tribal grouping, the Naiman, remained beyond his control … If Temujin could defeat the Naiman, his enemies would have nowhere to shelter and he would be undisputed leader of the unified Turco-Mongol steppe tribes. With so much at stake Temujin could not risk failure, and so he devised a careful plan …
On the day of the Feast of the Moon in the Year of the Rat (1204) Temujin led his troops into battle. To raise the morale of his own limited forces and intimidate the numerically superior Naiman, he employed a strategy that he was to use to great effect in future conflicts. By lighting countless camp-fires, mounting dummies on spare horses, and trailing branches and bushes from their own horses, the Mongols were able to create the impression that their numbers were far greater than they actually were.
The Mongols’ victory was total. Following this victory, all the other tribes that had once thought of independence were quick to promise their full loyalty. Only the Merkits attempted to escape, but within the same year they too had been destroyed.
[Source: republished with permission of ABC-CLIO, from Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule, George Lane, 2004;
permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.]
Source C
An unknown author, likely a member of the Borjigids (the imperial clan of Genghis Khan), describes the lead up to the fight against the Naimans, in the record of the affairs of the Borjigids, often known as Secret History of the Mongols (c1228).
Alakush [Khan of the Ongguts] sent a messenger to Chingis [Genghis] saying “Tayang of the Naimans is going to come and snatch your bows and arrows, and he asked me to be his right hand. I refused and now wish to inform you of this.” When Chingis received this message, he held a council. Many of those present said, “Our horses are lean, it is a bad moment for us” … [but others] said “the Naimans think that because their country is large and their people many they have the right to brag. Here is our opportunity to seize their bows and arrows” …
On the sixteenth day of the fourth month of the Year of the Rat (1204) Chingis [Genghis] went off to fight against the Naimans … Chingis with his main army reached the Sa’ari Steppe and camped there. Dodai-cherbi [a military commander] said to Chingis “We are few in number and have travelled a long way. We had better turn out our horses to graze and establish decoy troops in large numbers all over the Sa’ari Steppe (that is people of all kinds, other than combatants [fighters], were to be disguised as soldiers). At night, everyone should light five fires. The Naimans are great in force, but their ruler is timid and weak. He has never been far from home and will certainly be bewildered [confused] and deceived. Then, when our horses have eaten enough, we will push back their scouts, make straight for their main camp and fall upon them before they have time to draw up in battle order. In this way we should be sure to win.” Chingis took his advice.
Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about Genghis Khan’s [Temujin’s] fight with the Naiman in 1204.
Markscheme
Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.
Comparisons:
- Both sources suggest that the Naiman were a rival tribal group.
- Both sources agree that the Naiman had a numerically superior fighting force.
- Both sources reveal that the Mongols used deception as a strategy.
Contrasts:
- Source B suggests that Genghis’s attack on the Naiman was due to his ambition whereas Source C suggests that it was a response to the Naiman’s actions.
- From Source B it can be inferred that Genghis Khan alone decided to attack the Naiman whereas Source C suggests that he consulted a council that was divided on the decision to attack.
- Source C describes the role of Dodai-cherbi in developing the strategy for the battle whereas Source B suggests that Genghis planned the attack himself.
Examiners report
This question requires the comparison and contrast of two sources. Most candidates adopted the appropriate approach and were able to identify at least one comparison and/or contrast. However, there were several candidates that wrote lengthy descriptions of each source with limited direct linkage. Candidates are required to identify themes or points that can be compared/contrasted and write a running commentary rather than separate explanations of arguments given in each source. In addition, there were a number of responses that described or focused their commentary on the provenances of each source. To attain the top markband for this question, candidates need to offer more than one comparison and contrast, for example, two comparisons and two contrasts; although there need not be an equal number of each. Comparisons and contrasts should be clearly stated and the linkage points developed.
