The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source B

John Man, an historian specializing in Chinese and Mongolian history, writing in the biography Genghis Khan, Life, Death and Resurrection (2004).

The attack would not be easy. From a population ten times that of the Mongols, the Jin Emperor could draw cavalry and infantry numbering several hundred thousand, and his cities were well fortified.

Genghis’s invasion was carefully planned. In spring 1211 the Mongols advanced across the Gobi, well spread out and in several waves in order not to drain the scattered wells and pools. This was a huge operation: imagine something like 100 000 warriors with 300 000 horses, strung out in perhaps 10–20 groups of 5 000 to 10 000 each, each with camel-drawn carts, and all linked by fast-moving messengers as the army travelled 800 kilometres.

As the Mongol army spilled into northern China and approached the pass that led to Beijing, the Jin commander seems to have made a fatal mistake. He had a chance of launching a surprise attack when the Mongols were looting. Instead, perhaps to win time, he sent an officer to discuss peace terms. The officer promptly defected [joined the opposing side] with the information that the Jin were waiting at the far end of the pass. There the Jin cavalry, packed between ridges, was overwhelmed by arrows and a Mongol charge. Horsemen turned and trampled their own infantry.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source C

Frank McLynn, a military historian, writing in an academic biography, Genghis Khan: His conquests, His empire, His legacy (Dschingis Khan: Seine Eroberungen, sein Imperium, sein Vermächtnis) (2015).

The three pitched battles fought in September 1211 destroyed the Jin as a credible battlefield force. It is difficult to convey the extent of the Chinese losses at battles such as Badger Mouth, but nine years later travellers reported the fields of carnage still covered with bones. At the imperial court Chih-Chung was widely blamed for the disaster. It was said that he was too timid, that he should have attacked the Mongols with cavalry alone, and much earlier while they were still pillaging, but that he insisted on fighting with both cavalry and infantry on the field …

Genghis ordered Jebe to take Chu-yung chuan, a fortified pass. Jebe found Nankou, the town at the end of the pass, too strong to be taken by assault so he pretended to retreat. All along the fifteen-mile pass were fortresses perched on steep slopes. At news of Jebe’s retreat the soldiers all rushed out, eager to be in at the kill. Jebe led them on a chase for thirty-five miles, stretching them out so that the various groups of pursuers lost touch with each other. Then he turned and demolished them one group at a time, spreading panic that in the end led the defenders of Chu-yung chuan to surrender to the Mongols.

Early in November Genghis and the main army marched down the pass and pitched camp twenty miles from Peking [Beijing], accepting the surrender of three other important fortresses.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source A

An anonymous author, writing for the Mongol royal family after Genghis Khan’s death, in The Secret history of the Mongols (c14th century).

Genghis Khan set out to fight the people of north China. First he took the city of Fuzhou then marching through the Wild Fox Pass he took the city of Xuandefu. From here he sent out an army under Jebe’s command to take the fortress of Zhuyongguan.

When Jebe arrived there he saw that it was well defended, so he said “I’ll trick them and make them come out in the open. I’ll pretend to retreat and when they come out, I’ll attack them.” So Jebe retreated and the north Chinese army cried “Let’s go after them!” They poured out of their fortifications until the valleys and mountainsides were full of their soldiers. Jebe retreated to Sondi-i-wu Ridge and there he turned his army round to attack as the enemy rushed towards him in waves.

The north Chinese army was beaten. Close behind Jebe’s forces came Genghis Khan, commanding the great Middle Army. They too attacked, forcing the north Chinese army to retreat.

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Genghis Khan c1200–1227 – Campaigns: Mongol invasion of China: attacks on the Jin dynasty; capture of Beijing (1215).

Source D

An unknown artist depicts Mongol horsemen and the conditions they faced as they battled Jin warriors in the mountains. From The Compendium of Chronicles by Rashid-al-Din Hamadani (early 14th century).