Source C

Shlomo Ben-Ami, an Israeli historian and politician, writing in an academic book, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (2006).

(In the summer of 1967) Israel was surrounded by an all-Arab coalition aggressively supported by the Soviet Union, without being able to rely on an alliance with, or security guarantees from, a Western superpower …

De Gaulle was now about to formulate a new policy for France in an attempt to heal the wounds of the war in Algeria and build bridges with the Arab world, and he would not let the “arrogant” and trigger-happy [willing to fight] Israelis spoil his strategic shift. The British waited for America’s leadership. And America wavered. She was not ready to provide any guarantees or commitments. Israel’s almost hysterical appeal to the United States, to declare that any attack on Israel was equivalent to an attack on the US, was refused by US President Johnson who was distracted by his mounting troubles in the Vietnam War.

Source D

John Mearsheimer, a professor of Political Science, and Stephen Walt, a professor of International Affairs, writing in an academic book, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (2008).

It was the Kennedy administration that made the first tangible [real] US commitment to Israel’s military security … Kennedy authorized the first major sale of US weaponry to Israel in 1963. This reflected a number of strategic considerations—such as the desire to balance Soviet arms sales to Egypt and encourage Israel’s leaders to respond favourably to US peace initiatives—but Kennedy’s understandable desire to maintain support from Jewish voters and donors played a role in his decision as well. The sale opened the door to several additional weapons deals. In an attempt to disguise American involvement and thereby limit repercussions [consequences] in the Arab world, weapons were shipped to Israel by West Germany, which in turn received replacements from the United States.