To what extent was military superiority the main reason for initial Japanese victories in South‑East Asia (1940–1942)?

Candidates will consider the merits or otherwise of the suggestion that military superiority was the main reason for initial Japanese victories in South-East Asia. Reasons may predate the timeframe but they must be clearly linked to the issue raised in the question. Candidates may refer to the fact that the superior Japanese navy was the third largest after the British and US fleets, as well as the fact that both the navy and army were battle-hardened by previous battle. In contrast, the British, French, American and Dutch military forces in the region were limited and most lacking in combat experience. Other relevant causes may be addressed, for example, candidates may argue that the colonial governments were pre-occupied by the war in Europe and underestimated the Japanese, hence leading to the defeat of their colonies. In addition, they may highlight the strategic planning of the Japanese and their sound choice of tactics that allowed them to occupy French Indochina and British Malaya with little interference. Candidates’ opinions or conclusions will be presented clearly and supported by appropriate evidence.

There were several responses to this question. Candidates were required to offer a considered and balanced review of the statement that military superiority was the main reason for initial Japanese victories in South-East Asia (1940–1942). There were a few strong responses to this question, but the majority of responses seen did not give valid case studies. Korea and China are not in South-East Asia and therefore are not valid examples for this question. It is really important that candidates are aware of the different areas within the region of this paper.