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Date November 2021 Marks available 9 Reference code 21N.1.BP.TZ0.20
Level Both SL and HL Paper Paper 1 - first exams 2017 Time zone TZ0
Command term To what extent Question number 20 Adapted from N/A

Question

Source Q Scott Straus, a professor of political science, interviewing a former supporter of Hutu extremists who had also confessed to killing civilians, in the collection of accounts Intimate Enemy. Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide (2006).

[President] Habyarimana was the parent of Rwanda. Habyarimana did nothing bad to Tutsis … No person in Rwanda thought “I am Hutu. You are Tutsi.” Habyarimana prevented all that. We intermarried. All that was disturbed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) war …

We, the peasants, believed that the person who had killed the president was an enemy … they were Tutsis, so we believed the solution was to kill the Tutsi… We said we were defending ourselves against the enemy… All the things that happened in Rwanda were caused by the war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, and the people who are dead and the things that were destroyed, it was the RPF and the government in place that must answer for that.

[Source: Lyons, R. and Straus, S., 2006. Intimate Enemy. Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide. New York:
Zone Books, pp. 81–82. Adapted.]

Source R Photograph of Rwandan government soldiers atop a tank fleeing with civilians from advancing RPF forces (17 July 1994).

[Source: Corinne Dufka/Reuters. Rwandan government soldiers atop a tank equipped with a 90mm gun flee in front of
advancing RPF forces with civilians, July 17, 1994. [image online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/news/
picture/the-rwanda-genocide-idUSRTR3JZZT [Accessed 16 December 2020]. Adapted.]

Source S Linda Melvern, a British journalist, writing in the book Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (2004).

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander Dallaire met the Rwandan government, hoping to obtain permission to evacuate refugees in Kigali, [but] the government did not seem to be concerned by the horrendous ethnic killing.

On 23 April, Dallaire travelled to see the RPF leader Kagame … The RPF was disappointed that the “international community” had not stated its disgust with the violent destruction of the opposition political parties and the total survival of the government and its leaders.

Dallaire and Colonel Bagosora [Hutu extremist leader] then met on 28 April … Bagosora told Dallaire that the RPF was intending to conquer the whole country. His side had never refused to share power with the RPF. It was all the fault of the RPF for refusing to negotiate with the government …

The swift military success of the RPF in the country created an atmosphere of fear among the [government’s] army … Some officers were planning to massacre all the people in Kigali who were sheltering in hotels and churches, the vast majority of them Tutsi … On 28 April, Oxfam [an international charity] issued a press release stating that the pattern of systematic killing of the Tutsi amounted to genocide … But another story now dominated the headlines: with thousands of people from eastern Rwanda fleeing the RPF advance, this was the fastest exodus [mass movement] of people the world had seen.

[Source: Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. Linda Melvern. First published by Verso 2004
© Linda Melvern 2004 all rights reserved. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.]

Source T André Guichaoua, a professor of sociology, writing in the academic book From War to Genocide. Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994 (2017).

[Even the] Rwandan government’s … most eager defenders doubted that the war against the RPF could be won … If defeat at the hands of the RPF could not be avoided, none of [the] Tutsi … should be left to profit from their victory … Their primary objective was to exterminate the potential political base for the RPF and its allies … From 12 April onward, government politicians linked their political futures to a conclusion of the war through genocide and the elimination of Tutsi … For its part, the RPF’s repeated refusals to negotiate fell in line with the government’s murderous strategy.

When the RPF finally agreed to engage in discussions between 22 April and 14 May 1994, it refused to negotiate with the government’s representative. But there was no longer anything for the two sides to negotiate, the RPF did not want to hear anything more about a ceasefire. This is exactly what Dallaire confirmed in his message to the UN on 24 April, which summarized his conversation with Paul Kagame: “He did not appear interested in a ceasefire. His forces were winning the war and were going to continue fighting as long as they were winning.”

[Source: From From War to Genocide by André Guichaoua, Translated by Don E. Webster, Foreword by Scott Straus.
Reprinted by permission of the University of Wisconsin Press. © 2017 by the Board of Regents of the University
of Wisconsin System. All rights reserved.]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree that the actions of the RPF intensified the violence in Rwanda in 1994?

Markscheme

Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.

Indicative content

Source Q The RPF war and the assassination of Habyarimana had destabilized Rwanda. The Tutsi were held responsible for the death of the president. But both sides, the RPF and the government, were responsible for the escalation in violence.

Source R The advance of the RPF had forced the government’s military into retreat and this led to large numbers of civilians to flee the violent situation in Rwanda.

Source S Hutu leaders believed that the RPF were responsible as it had refused to negotiate with the government. However, the government’s military had planned to kill the Tutsi, thus increasing violence.

Source T The RPF did not want a ceasefire as it was winning the war. As a consequence, the government decided to destroy the RPF’s Tutsi power base through a policy of genocide.

Own knowledge Candidates may offer more detail on the role of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the legacy of the civil war and the policies of RPF leader Paul Kagame. It could also be argued that the government, and its Hutu extremist supporters, were responsible for the violence. Bagosora had not supported the Arusha Accords; after the assassination of Habyarimana he appointed the extremist government. The crisis committee had the real power and, led by Bagosora, implemented the genocide.
Candidates may argue that the violence against the Tutsi had been pre-planned. The role of the media was important, for example in distributing the Hutu 10 Commandments; the role of Kangura magazine and the incitement to violence by the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines [RTLM]. Candidates may argue that the inaction of the international community, despite Dallaire’s warnings in the Genocide Cable, contributed to the escalation of violence.

Examiners report

Most scripts showed an awareness of the need to give a focused response and refer to / use the sources to analyse the question. Many responses also had a degree of development. Often candidates were able to use the sources to offer an assessment of, for example, why Germany attacked Poland in September 1939 for Question 12, or to discuss the contribution of the Civil Rights and the Voting Act in ensuring that African Americans could exercise their right to vote for Question 16. Furthermore, there was some improvement in the number of candidates effectively applying and synthesizing their knowledge in conjunction with a focused use of the sources.

However, some responses were limited by a wholly descriptive approach and some lacked clear and consistent focus on the set question. A number of responses referred to the source/s but did not effectively use the content to develop or support the analysis. In addition, a number of responses lacked the inclusion of relevant knowledge, and a sizeable minority of candidates did not respond at all to the final question or gave a very limited response.

Syllabus sections

Prescribed subjects: first exams 2017 » 5. Conflict and intervention » Case study 1: Rwanda (1990– 1998) » Course and interventions » Actions of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Rwandan government; role of the media
Prescribed subjects: first exams 2017 » 5. Conflict and intervention » Case study 1: Rwanda (1990– 1998) » Course and interventions
Prescribed subjects: first exams 2017 » 5. Conflict and intervention » Case study 1: Rwanda (1990– 1998)
Prescribed subjects: first exams 2017 » 5. Conflict and intervention
Prescribed subjects: first exams 2017

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