Source B

Peter Jackson, a professor of medieval history, writing in an academic book, The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410 (2005).

The cohesiveness of the Mongol military stood in sharp contrast with the disunity of their enemies, which Genghis Khan and his successors took care to exploit. The political fragmentation of early 13th-century Rus’ under the prolific Riurikid dynasty is well known. But division also characterized the two most formidable powers confronting the Mongols. Jurchen rule was deeply resented by the Khitan still living in the borderlands of China, large numbers of whom joined the Mongols or coordinated their own operations against the Chin [Jin] with those of Mongol commanders. Subsequently, even native Chinese and Jurchen officers and troops defected to the invaders. In western Asia, the Khwarazm shah’s bitter quarrel with the ‘Abbasid Caliph impaired [weakened] his capacity to pose as a champion of orthodoxy and the Jihad, while the unreliability of significant elements in his recently gained dominions undermined his preparations for resistance. By contrast, the religious tolerance that characterized Genghis Khan’s empire also served the Mongols well, so that the Gur-khan’s Muslim subjects in eastern Turkestan, who had been persecuted by Kuchlug, welcomed them as liberators.

[Source: From: The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410, Peter Jackson, 2014,
Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source C

Jack Weatherford, a professor of anthropology and a specialist in tribal peoples, writing in an academic book, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (2004).

[Mongol] tactics seemed to be, at least in part, a combination of older fighting techniques and hunting strategies; yet the consistent inability of the perplexed [confused] enemy to respond effectively to this form of warfare indicated that Temujin [Genghis Khan] had introduced enough innovation to make these strategies uniquely his own. Temujin had produced a new type of steppe army based on a greater variety of tactics and, most important, close cooperation among the men and complete obedience to their commanders. They were no longer an attacking horde of individuals; they were now a united formation. Temujin used a set of manoeuvres that each man had to know and to which each responded precisely and without hesitation. The Mongols had a saying: “If he sends me into fire or water I go. I go for him.” The saying reflected not just an ideal, but the reality of the new Mongol warfare, and it made short order of [rapidly defeated] the Naiman.

[Source: Excerpt(s) from GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD by Jack Weatherford,
copyright © 2004 by Jack Weatherford. Used by permission of Crown Books, an imprint of the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved. Any third party use of this material, outside of this publication, is prohibited. Interested parties must apply directly to Penguin Random House LLC for permission.]