

Extended essay cover

Candidates must complete this page and then give to	his cover and their final v	ersion of the extended	f essay to their supervisor.
Candidate session number			
Candidate name	no e en e		
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Examination session (May or November)	May	Year	2015
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Title of the extended essay: What a 2013 November Crisis Ukrainium Revolut	and subs		
Candidate's declaration This declaration must be signed by the candi	idate; otherwise a ma	rk of zero will be is	ssued.
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Candidate's signature:		Date:	12/15/14

Supervisor's report and declaration

The supervisor must complete this report, sign the declaration and then give the final version of the extended essay, with this cover attached, to the Diploma Programme coordinator.

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Name of supervisor (CAPITAL letters)	

Please comment, as appropriate, on the candidate's performance, the context in which the candidate undertook the research for the extended essay, any difficulties encountered and how these were overcome (see page 13 of the extended essay guide). The concluding interview (viva voce) may provide useful information. These comments can help the examiner award a level for criterion K (holistic judgment). Do not comment on any adverse personal circumstances that may have affected the candidate. If the amount of time spent with the candidate was zero, you must explain this, in particular how it was then possible to authenticate the essay as the candidate's own work. You may attach an additional sheet if there is insufficient space here.

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This declaration must be signed by the supervisor; otherwise a mark of zero will be issued.

I have read the final version of the extended essay that will be submitted to the examiner.

To the best of my knowledge, the extended essay is the authentic work of the candidate.

As per the section entitled "Responsibilities of the Supervisor" in the EE guide, the recommended number of hours spent with candidates is between 3 and 5 hours. Schools will be contacted when the number of hours is left blank, or where O hours are stated and there lacks an explanation. Schools will also be contacted in the event that number of hours spent is significantly excessive compared to the recommendation.

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Assessment form (for examiner use only)

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A research question	2	2		2	
B introduction	7	2		2	
C investigation	2	4		4	
D knowledge and understanding	2	4		4	
E reasoned argument	[2]	4		4	
F analysis and evaluation	2	4		4	
G use of subject language		4		4	
H conclusion	2	2		2	
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What were the root causes of the 2013 November Crisis and the subsequent 2014 <u>Ukrainian Revolution?</u>

International Baccalaureate Extended Essay 2015 V
Peace and Conflict Studies V

Word Count: 3,613

What were the root causes of the 2013 November Crisis and the subsequent 2014 Ukrainian Revolution?

ABSTRACT:

In November of 2013, Ukraine's second revolution in a span of nine years commenced in Kyiv. The revolution persisted nationwide until February of 2014 and it is estimated that at least 200 people were killed in clashes between protesters and government riot police. The actual causes of the revolution are not the same as the triggering event to the conflict, and this will be examined through the question "What were the root causes of the 2013 November Crisis and the subsequent 2014 Ukrainian Revolution?

In this essay, I will examine the deeply rooted issues and factors that were setting the stage in Ukraine for full scale revolution by investigating how multiple peace and conflict theories apply in the context of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. Many of the common peace and conflict theories that are evident in other crises around the world are relevant to Ukraine. They constitute a large component of the root causes that fueled the conflict.

As the crisis in Ukraine has many similar types of root causes as other conflicts, understanding the critical issues facing Ukraine prior to the revolution can provide insight on the root causes of other events of such magnitude around the world. Recognizing and analyzing the root causes of a conflict provides a clearer view of how interconnected these causes are and how they all play a role in not only causing the conflict but fueling other root causes themselves. Hopefully, apprehending a greater understanding of root causes of conflicts like Ukraine can heighten the chances of one day peacefully defusing tensions that are caused by them.

Word Count: 264

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INTRODUCTION

At a session of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine on November 21, 2013, the Ukrainian government announced a dramatic last minute reversal of its pursuit of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. The announcement came after months of economic and political pressure from Ukraine's mighty neighbor to the east, the Russian Federation. The unpopular decision resulted in mass protests in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, eventually spreading nationwide, culminating in the impeachment of pro-Kremlin President Viktor Yanukovych on February 21, 2014. The months of conflict between protesters and the Ukrainian government led to around 200 deaths, though certain agencies claim that the number is upwards of 780 deaths and well over 1,000 people injured (Interfax-Ukraine). To the average individual watching the news, it would seem that the cause of the revolution was an unpopular government decision to spurn a political and economic agreement with the European Union, consequently looking the other way towards Russia. This, however, is not the case. Kyiv's eleventh hour rejection of the European Union agreement acted as the trigger to the revolution. The root causes of the revolution are deeply embedded and significantly more complex. A multitude of the key issues that fueled Ukraine's revolution are comparable to factors exacerbating crises around the world, therefore understanding the root causes of Ukraine's revolution can help provide insight on crises in other multi-ethnic and multilingual nations facing tumultuous times. Among the most prominent root causes of Ukraine's revolution are the differences in national identity across the country, the linguistic differences, disputes on political ideologies, and

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UKRAINE PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION

Preceding the revolution, Ukraine was a nation that was generally divided on prominent topics such as European Union integration. In October 2013, an independent Ukrainian organization called RATING ran a nationwide poll and determined that 53% of Ukraine supported further integration with the European Union, but 34% of the nation leaned towards Ukraine's former imperial master, Russia, and preferred accession to the Russian-led Customs Union. Pro-Russian and pro-Western governments changed hands often, most notably when Ukraine made world headlines in 2004 during the Orange Revolution. Ukraine's decision to pursue a political and economic agreement with the European Union was viewed as a defining moment for the nation and while it satisfied the majority, a significant minority felt uncertain about a European Union future. Nevertheless, President Yanukovych's reversal on the agreement triggered the revolution whose root causes are much more than just political and economic association with the European Union.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LINGUISTIC ISSUES

One of the most prominent root causes of this revolution was the importance of national identity in Ukraine. National Identity is "one of the fundamental human needs that underlies many intractable conflicts [of interest]" (Maiese, 1), The initial wave of protests in the Ukrainian capital city of Kviv were staged by those enraged by the reversal of a European Union path for Ukraine's future. These Ukrainian citizens typically and broadly identified themselves as "Europeans." As the revolution progressed and became a call for the ouster of the government of president Viktor Yanukovych. protesters nationwide began to reaffirm that their national identity was "Ukrainian." Indeed, a decent portion of protesters during the revolution were comprised of Ukrainian nationalists. Nationalism, as an ideology, "affirms the existence of peoples or nations whose members share a common history and destiny"/(Maiese, 1). Ukrainian nationalists are usually vehemently opposed to any integration, be it economically, socially or politically, with Russia, citing years of past imperialism and cultural oppression under Russian rule. While the extent to which Ukrainian nationalists showed their political views varied, nationalist sentiments can often highlight and exacerbate friction between groups of people within a country and often plays a role in one's national identity. Opponents of the pro-European Union protesters and supporters of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych held a different view of their national identity. They did not necessarily identify with Russia as "Russian." Rather, they possessed no true single national identity at all. Opponents of European Union integration in Ukraine are generally centered, but are not limited to, the nation's industrial eastern Donbas region and the

recently disputed Crimean peninsula. These Ukrainians are more nostalgic of the late Soviet-era Ukraine, and some even continue to identify themselves as Soviet citizens (Rosenberg, 1). Despite the political repression, there was a relative sense of economic prosperity in eastern and southern Ukraine at the time which satisfied a large portion of its residents. These Ukrainians saw Viktor Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, as defenders of the interests of pro-Neo-Soviet Ukrainians. This conflict in national identity in Ukraine has been present ever since the nation's overwhelmingly favorable secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. It has resulted in tense political situations within Ukraine's government and has played a tremendous role in causing and fueling the 2014 revolution.

The crisis of national identify in Ukraine is further exacerbated by the complex linguistic issues across the nation. Linguistic and cultural identities play a central role in causing conflicts as they are typically "stronger and more enduring than most other collective identities" (Gurr, 63). While the majority of Ukrainians identify Ukrainian as their native language and mother tongue (according to the 2001 Ukrainian State Census), Russian, by far the largest minority language in the country, is still commonly used and is used almost exclusively in certain regions of Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Constitution, Ukrainian is the sole state language, but use of the Russian language is guaranteed absolute protection and freedom of use (Yekelchyk, 23). Naturally, it is possible that some Ukrainian citizens who speak Russian daily and overwhelmingly more than Ukrainian will choose identify more as Russian. The debate

on whether Russian should be made a second official language in Ukraine is one of the most sensitive and controversial political topics. Many Ukrainians see the use of Russian in Ukraine as a posthumous victory for the Soviet Union and an extension of cultural repression against those who identify as Ukrainian and speak the Ukrainian language. Conversely, many Russian speakers in Ukraine assert that it is their constitutional right to use the Russian language on the territory of Ukraine and that it should be established as a second state language. While the linguistic issues are not directly a cause itself, they do constitute a large part of national identity of Ukrainians and essentially acted as a catalyst in the crisis of national identity that fueled this revolution.

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

Another crucial root factor that played a role in causing and shaping the revolution was the prominence of a particular ideological conflict and the subsequent struggle for power. Ideological conflicts develop when two parties (it can be both internally or internationally) possess differences over beliefs and/or values ranging from political and economic issues to religious questions. The most prevalent ideological conflict in independent Ukraine is whether Ukraine should turn to the east to its former imperial master, Russia, or whether Kyiv should continue to integrate itself with the West and become a European Union member, and, potentially, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATQ) (Lada, 1). According to the RATING poll mentioned earlier, a majority of Ukrainians support the idea of deepening cooperation with the European Union and the West, and to eventually become a member state of the European Union.

The other group of Ukrainians, comprising about 34% of the nation's population and mostly those aged 45 or over, advocate for a return to closer ties with Moscow and accession to the Russian-led Customs Union of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. This ideological struggle has existed in Ukraine since its independence and its roots date back to the pre-World War One era.

The pro-European Union ideology dominates western Ukraine and holds a majority amongst central Ukrainians, while the Eurosceptics and pro-Russian ideology is more apparent in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Of course it is not a perfectly drawn line, as there are many pro-European Union citizens living in eastern Ukraine and some Eurosceptics living in western Ukraine. The important factor is to understand why this general distribution of ideologies exists. The territory of what is now western Ukraine was not under Russian influence until after the Second World War in 1945. What is now eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, had been under imperial Russian rule for hundreds of years, with brief surges of independence in between. The eastern Ukrainian oblasts (equivalent of US States in Ukraine) bore the brunt of Russification policies in the late Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nationalist Ukrainians in the eastern part of the country at the time were forced to remain silent, or were liquidated by the Russians/Soviets, as seen by the Holodomor: a man-made famine under the rule of the brutal Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, which Ukraine and its allies classify as a genocide against the Ukrainian people and an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation. Naturally, in an environment like eastern Ukraine under Russo-Soviet rule, many people

were captivated (while some might say brainwashed) by the Russification policies and began to identify themselves as Russian, and not Ukrainian (Plokhy, 254). Moreover, Stalin transplanted thousands upon thousands of ethnic Russians into Ukrainian regions such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhia. Stalin even forcibly expelled Crimean Tatars, native to Crimea, from the Crimean Peninsula, replacing them with ethnic Russians (Malynovska, 1). On the other hand, most of central and western Ukraine managed to avoid the worst of the Russification campaign, and was therefore less effective in those regions/(Rakhmanny, 87). In a contemporary context, the effects of these policies can provide an understanding at the stark ideological differences between a single ethnicity. Those who were brought up in an environment where they were taught to love everything about Russia and to identify themselves as Russian see integration with the European Union as a threat to who they are. These individuals see integration and membership in the European Union as Kyiv and the Ukrainian nationalists forcing them to distance themselves from Moscow economically, politically and socially. Those with the pro-European Union ideology see it much differently. Pro-EU Ukrainians, for the most part, see Russia as their number one enemy and a volatile threat to their sovereignty and existence as a state. They view Russian and Soviet actions as attempts to destroy their culture and their nation. Furthermore, these Ukrainians associate the corruption and poor living and economic conditions with policies put into place by pro-Kremlin politicians. Pro-EU Ukrainians see the future with the European Union as an opportunity to develop a free and fair democratic state with the rule of law and lasting positive peace, and perceive a future with Russia as a path back

to a corrupt autocracy without a chance to build positive peace. In sum, this difference in ideologies, a result of historic grievances between the two nations, has caused an ideological split in the Ukrainian people. Despite the majority of people supporting the deal with the European Union, the large pro-Russian minority continue to maintain an influence in Ukrainian politics, and this naturally creates a very tense atmosphere that causes conflict and that has contributed to the culmination of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution.

Moreover, the ideological struggle has to be won by one side. Up until the revolution, the pro-Russian ideology commanded power in Ukraine as Donetsk native Viktor Yanukovych was president, therefore, the pro-Russians wielded power in government. This pushed those with pro-European Union and pro-Ukrainian views into opposition. As with any ideological conflict, the ideology in power is, of course, the ideology that the nation will be told to follow. Unless the ruling group with the opposite ideology is truly inclusive and wants to negotiate and compromise with the other group, which is indeed quite rare, this situation has the potential to cause the people with the ideology in opposition to develop a sense of wounded identity. Wounded identity is a certain factor in one's identity that was, at a certain point, attacked or exploited negatively in some way. This common sense of wounded identity can be harnessed by leaders to escalate conflict into violence. These "agitators" can "inflame men's minds," setting the "scene and the war can begin," while assuring that it is "the others'" fault (Maloouf, 27). Hamessing such a sense of wounded identity can be comparable to

"scapegoating" a group. These leaders do so to "intensify" a hatred of one another "as they direct it towards another group"/(Staub, 294). In the context of Ukraine, it can be argued that those with pro-European Union and pro-Ukrainian ideology had a sense of wounded identity as the Yanukovych government attempted to withdraw Ukraine from any deal with the European Union and to demote the Ukrainian language by placing Russian alongside it as a state language. Conversely, this can also apply to the pro-Russian ideology. When the pro-European Union post-revolutionary interim government took power and a draft law was introduced to the Verkhovna Rada to establish Ukrainian as the only official language on all levels of the law, this triggered a sense of wounded identity within the group of Ukrainians with a pro-Russian ideological platform (Kramer 1). They claimed that the pro-European Union Ukrainians in power were attempting to promote the hatred of Russian identity and the Russian language in Ukraine and violating basic human rights. As a result, this caused another conflict, however on slightly different grounds and significantly more violent. Nevertheless, the power struggle amongst ideologies and the sense of wounded identity is also deeply rooted within Ukrainian society and created a tense situation that incited the subsequent revolution.

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

The high prevalence of structural violence against the Ukrainian people prior to November 21st also played a role in causing the 2014 revolution. Structural (or indirect) violence is a type of violence that is done to large groups of individuals by oppressive social, economic and legal institutions which hamper the ability for people to develop to their true potential and meet their basic requirements, resulting in an "unnecessary insult of basic needs" (Galtung, 196). It is so structural because it is "embedded in the political and economic organization of our social world" (Farmer, 89). Structural violence is also difficult to take responsibility for as it is nearly impossible to pin blame on a single person or a small group of individuals. It is typically perpetrated by a relatively large group of people who are looking out for their own personal interests as opposed to the well-being of the average citizen. In Ukraine, citizens endured structural violence mostly through oppressive political and economic institutions that, incidentally, often work hand in hand. Generally speaking, the vast majority of Ukrainians were subject to said structural violence, but some people in some regions experienced it more than others.

The election of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 led to significant policy reversals of the preceding government. The most notable and controversial, however, was the repealment of a constitutional amendment that was passed by his pro-Western predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko. The amendment essentially barred the president from having an excess of power and distributed said power throughout Ukraine's three



branches of government. As a result of its repealment, power in the Ukrainian government became more centralized, and political and economic institutions became tremendously more extractive rather than inclusive (Ukraine: The 1996 Constitution Is Reinstated, 1). Other political changes led to corrupt individuals within the government having the ability to participate in a number of corrupt practices such as electoral and particularly financial fraud. Critical media that attempted to report on these issues were either pressured or threatened out of doing so. Even though media was technically able to critique the government, they often encountered tremendous roadblocks and obstacles when attempting to publicize any negative views on government actions, explaining why Ukraine's Press Freedom Index score by Reporters Without Borders dropped from 89th in the world to 131st under the Yanukovych regime. In 2009, Yushchenko's last year in office, Ukraine's level of debt was about 90 billion dollars, while in December 2013, three years into Yanukovych's term, Ukraine's debt rose by about 50 billion dollars, clocking in at around 140 billion dollars (Pyke, 1). The result of all these drastic changes took a significant toll on the average Ukrainian citizen. As of this year, Ukrainians, on average, have the lowest monthly salary in the entirety of Europe. Rich Ukrainian oligarchs, some with seats in local or national government, commanded a tight grip on the nation's political and economic institutions, making them increasingly extractive. These extractive institutions are such that "are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset" (Acemoglu, 83). The "legacy" of these institutions pave the way for the failure of a state, as they "concentrate power and wealth, opening the way for unrest, strife, and civil war"

(Acemoglu, 376). Moreover, money laundering in high places of Ukraine's government was suspected as infrastructure and public service funding decreased while the political elite and oligarchs continued to become wealthier and wealthier. Viktor Yanukovych has even been accused of thieving seventy billion dollars from the state treasury of Ukraine. The rate of poverty in Ukraine began to sharply increase, it became increasingly more difficult for average citizens to meet their basic needs, and Ukrainians struggled to compete with the rest of Europe from a financial standpoint.

This structural violence was almost entirely perpetrated through boundless governmental corruption. Yanukovych and his allies' main goal was to preserve their power and to continue to rule Ukraine based on their political and economic desires. When Yulia Tymoshenko, an opposition candidate for the then-scheduled 2015 Ukrainian presidential election, was imprisoned on charges of abuse of power along with her close political ally Yuriy Lutsenko, many decried the ruling as the Yanukovych government's way of eliminating opposition. People began to continuously criticize and protest Yanukovych for his corrupt practices and actions. The reversal on the decision of signing the European Union deal in and of itself epitomized his corruption. He lied to the Ukrainian people and campaigned that Ukraine would sign the deal, and in the absolute last minute, announced that Ukraine was changing course and examining closer ties with the Russian-led Customs Union: the ideological opponent to the European Union. This was one of the most prominent root issues that set the stage for this revolution. The Ukrainian people had enough of the corruption they experienced during the Soviet Union

(though it must be noted that a small minority in some parts of Ukraine would disagree with such a statement) (Balmforth, 1). When the draconian anti-protest laws were so-called 'passed' with scores of voting procedure violations in the midst of the protests in Kyiv, the conflict escalated into outright violence. It was at that moment where some protesters reached the point where it resorted to violence, because of a blatantly corrupt act by the government to preserve their own power. The situation had gone from negative peace (a state where there is an absence of violence) to full on violence.

Accordingly, this goes to show that the issue of structural violence and corruption in Ukraine was one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent, root cause which propelled the revolution forward.

CONCLUSION

Altogether, the 2013 November Crisis and the subsequent 2014 Ukrainian Revolution were caused by much more than simply then-President Yanukovych's rejection of the political and economic agreement with the European Union. While the rejection of the deal acted as the trigger, the underlying root causes have spanned hundreds of years and are tremendously relevant to modern Ukraine. A stark difference in political ideology between the majority pro-European Union and the significant pro-Russian minority resulted in the uproar from pro-EU Ukrainians as the deal was initially rejected. The complex divisions with national identity and linguistic preferences presented immediate and fully visible fault lines amongst Ukrainians that had been causing friction in Ukraine even before the nation attained independence from the Soviet

Union in 1991. Moreover, the long standing historical prevalence of structural violence and "unnecessary insult to basic needs" (Galtung, 197) through means of corruption and transformation of economic and political institutions from inclusive to extractive led to massive dissatisfaction amongst the Ukrainian people and a loss of trust with their government. It is crucial to understand that these root causes of Ukraine's revolution were not isolated and irrelevant to one another. Each root cause is interconnected to the other in some way. Stark linguistic differences within Ukraine would not be as extensive if Ukraine was a completely homogenous state with little variation in terms of ethnicity, and vice versa as well. The people's differences in political ideologies directly stem from the nation's troubled communist past where some grew to despise the system marred with structural violence while others came to accept it. Conversely, said structural viøfence may have even been averted (if not, at least avoided to a certain extent) if the differences between political ideologies were not as extreme as they are. Furthermore, there exists a relationship between linguistics and political ideologies, as well as national identity and structural violence, resulting in a vicious cycle of root causes to the Ukrainian revolution. All in all, these factors have all played the role of root causes of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. While these root causes have existed for hundreds of years, they are still absolutely imperative to the status of Ukraine today, and they will, most likely, continue to shape the future of Ukraine and its people for years to eome.

Word Count: 3,613

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Topic: ULGLAINE

J: ABSTRACT: Under 300 □, RQ □, how investigation undertaken (scope) □, conclusion(s) □. Over 300 / Not ALL of: RQ / Scope / Conc. (0) under 300 /RQ / Scope / Conc NOT all clear. (1) All clear :RQ / Scope / Conclusion. (2) Comment:	2
B: INTRODUCTION: Does intro makes clear how RQ relates to existing knowledge ☐ Explain how topic is significant & worthy of investigation ☐ (0) Little / no attempt made to set RQ into context ☐. Little / no attempt to explain significance of the topic ☐.	2
(1) Some attempt to set RQ in context □. Some attempt to explain significance of topic and why worthy of investigation □. (2) Context of RQ is clearly demonstrated □. Intro clearly explains significance of topic and why worthy of investigation □.	
A: RESEARCH QUESTION: Is the purpose of the essay specified: RQ in Intro /Title and RQ suitable for P/C (0) RQ NOT stated in intro □/ does not lend itself to a systematic investigation in a P/C EE □. (Max for C/D/E is level 2)	2
 (1) RQ stated in intro or title but not clearly expressed or too broad in scope to be treated effectively within the word limit. (2) RQ clearly stated in intro or title / sharply focused, making effective treatment possible within the word limit. Comment: 	2-
I: FORMAL PRESENTATION: Under 4,000	42
C: INVESTIGATION: Extent investigation is planned and appropriate range of sources consulted / data gathered relevant to the RQ. (0) Little / no evidence that sources consulted / data gathered □. Little / no evidence of planning in the investigation. □ (1) Range of inappropriate sources consulted /inappropriate data gathered □. Little evidence investigation planned. □	4
(2) Limited range of appropriate sources consulted /data gathered □. Some relevant material selected □. Some planning. □ (3) Sufficient range of appropriate sources consulted / data gathered □. Relevant material selected □. Satisfactorily planned. □ (4) Imaginative range of appropriate sources consulted / data gathered □. Relevant material carefully selected □. Well planned. □	2
D: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: "Academic context" Evidence that candidate has knowledge of related PACS concepts (Bibliography) (0)no real knowledge or understanding of the topic. No references to Peace and Conflict Studies in Bibliography. □ (1) some knowledge but little understanding of the topic. Shows little awareness of a PACS context for the investigation. No Refs. □	4 .
(2) an adequate knowledge and some understanding of the topic. Shows some awareness of a PACS context. (3) a good knowledge and understanding of the topic. Successfully outlines a PACS context for the investigation. (4) a very good knowledge and understanding of the topic. Clearly and precisely located in Peace and Conflict Studies	2-
E: REASONED ARGUMENT: Ideas presented in a logical and coherent manner Reasoned argument developed in relation to the RQ (10) No attempt to develop a reasoned argument in relation to the RQ.	4
(1) Limited or superficial attempt to present ideas in a logical / coherent manner, or develop a reasoned argument in relation to the RQ. (2) Some attempt to present ideas in a logical / coherent manner. Partially successful development of reasoned argument in relation to the RQ. (3) Ideas presented in a logical and coherent manner. Reasoned argument developed in relation to the RQ. some weaknesses. (4) Ideas presented clearly / logical and coherent manner. Reasoned and convincing argument in relation to RQ. (5) Ideas presented clearly / logical and coherent manner. Reasoned and convincing argument in relation to RQ.	2
F: ANALYSIS of conflict dynamics , positions and interests of parties in conflict , Analysis of possible solutions NO analysis or evaluation of parties positions / interests or possible solutions (0) LITTLE(1) SOME(2) SOUND / PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE(3) EFFECTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED(4)	2
G: PRESENTATION OF THEORIES relevant to PACS. The language used is (0) is inaccurate and unclear □. No effective use of terms appropriate for P/C Studies □.	4
(1) sometimes communicates clearly \(\frac{1}{n} \) not consistently. \(\frac{1}{n} \) Partially accurate use of P/C terms. \(\frac{1}{n} \) (2) For the most part communicates clearly. Appropriate / usually accurate use of P/C terms. \(\frac{1}{n} \)	1
 (3) communicates clearly □. Accurate use of P/C terms, occasional lapses. □ (4) communicates clearly and precisely □. Accurate use of P/C terms showing skill and understanding. □ 	
H: CONCLUSION: Assesses if a relevant conclusion, consistent with the evidence in the essay, is provided Little or no attempt made to provide a conclusion relevant to RQ. (0)	2
Conclusion attempted relevant to RQ / not entirely consistent with the evidence presented in EE. (1) Effective conclusion clearly stated \Box ; relevant to RQ \Box , consistent with evidence presented \Box Incl. unresolved questions, where approp. (2)	2
K: HOLISTIC JUDGEMENT: Assesses intellectual initiative, depth of understanding and insight. While these qualities will be clearly present in the best work, less successful essays may also show some evidence of them and should be rewarded under this criterion.	4
Evidence of initiative, depth of understanding and insight. Supervisor Comment suggests no (0) little (1) some (2) clear (3) considerable (4) Examination of essay shows no (0) little (1) some (2) clear (3) considerable (4)	2
GENERAL COMMENTS TOTAL/36 NOTE Character Conditate her C POD (8/2)	1

Note strong EE. Condidate her c poor grappy 1 ge Thought in mappy prets applied. The hear is reasonable and the and address mix of cours "

a Marph fired way, Conclusion is Therfore appropriate.

PLR/DATE