



Extended essay cover

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Candidate session number			
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Examination session (May or November)	MAY	Year	2014

Diploma Programme subject in which this extended essay is registered: HISTORY

(For an extended essay in the area of languages, state the language and whether it is group 1 or group 2.)

Title of the extended essay: To what extent did western aggression transform China's diplomacy between 1842 and 1864?

Candidate's declaration

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The extended essay I am submitting is my own work (apart from guidance allowed by the International Baccalaureate).

I have acknowledged each use of the words, graphics or ideas of another person, whether written, oral or visual.

I am aware that the word limit for all extended essays is 4000 words and that examiners are not required to read beyond this limit.

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Student advisory exemplar - History exemplar B

Criteria	Maximum mark	Descriptor level achieved	Comments
A Research question	2	2	
B Introduction	2	1	
C Investigation	4	3	
D Knowledge and understanding	4	3	
E Reasoned argument	4	3	Borderline 2/3 performance here, but best fit applied suits the wording of the level 3 descriptor.
F Analysis and evaluation	4	2	
G Use of subject language	4	3	
H Conclusion	2	2	
I Formal Presentation	4	3	
J Abstract	2	2	
K Holistic judgment	4	2	
Total		26	
Summative comment		See comments throughout the essay.	

**International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme
Examination Session: May 2014
History Extended Essay**

**To what extent did western aggression transform
China's diplomacy between 1842-1864?**

The essay is within the word count. An appropriate "command term"/task which gives a clear indication of the chronological period to be investigated.

Word Count: 3742
September 30, 2013

The RQ is clearly stated, with brief context provided. Using phrases such as "some historians" or "other historians" should be avoided. Instead, provide specific examples. Scope - this is provided, indicating areas which will be examined in order to address the task. Conclusion - this too is provided. Therefore, all elements are covered for the purpose of the Abstract.

Abstract

The defeat of the First Opium War 1839-1842 and Second Opium War 1856-1860 stapled the Qing Dynasty to a series of treaties. At first, the terms of these treaties led to minor institutional changes. From 1861 to 1864, however, the Qing rapidly invested in modernization initiatives such as the ZongLi Yamen, Interpreters School and the adoption of international law that led to considerable departure from Chinese traditional diplomacy. According to some historians, these initiatives directly resulted from western aggression. Other historians argue that internal dynamics played a significant role in diplomatic modernization. This essay analyzes: **“To what extent did western aggression transform China’s diplomacy between 1842-1864?”**

To answer this question, Chinese diplomacy prior to 1842 along with external and internal threats between 1842-1864 is central to understanding the Qing’s diplomatic transformation. First, western military aggression of the First and Second Opium War that legally bounded the Qing into treaty diplomacy is looked into. As well, the internal dynamics such as the Qing’s change of external outlook and domestic rebellions are examined. This investigation uses the Impact-Response and the Challenge-Reaction Model as main points of reference, and both primary and secondary sources to interpret the fundamental reasons for the Qing’s diplomatic transformation.

The conclusion reached is that western aggression catalyzed the diplomatic modernization. Although the pressure exerted by western gunboats in the First and Second Opium War forced the Qing into treaty diplomacy and direct diplomatic representation in Beijing, the major and most significant modernization initiatives were the Qing’s own decision to initiate. The Qing acknowledged the need for self-strengthening policies in order to restore stability after its perspective change in 1860 and the threat of internal rebellions. Western aggression was an important factor that contributed to the speed of the Qing’s diplomatic modernization; however it was not the principle cause.

WORD COUNT: 300

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my history teacher and extended essay supervisor who provided me with valuable feedback throughout this entire process. I am grateful to my school librarian for assisting me with the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines to typeset this essay. Finally, I would also like to dedicate this paper to my parents, especially my father, for sharing their love for East Asian History with me.

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The Table of Contents shows how the essay has been planned and structured in order to allow the research question to be addressed.

Introduction

Today, China is diplomatically represented in many countries all over the world. It is difficult to imagine China once isolated herself and refused to establish relations with the West. This period of unresponsiveness and reclusiveness to the West is referred to as the close-door policy.¹ This raises questions such as what led to the opening of China and for what reasons did China's foreign policy change so drastically. As a Chinese-Canadian who is bombarded with only Chinese perspectives from familial discussions on western influence on imperial China- western powers used gunboats to exploit the Qing into modernization- I question validity of these statements. This essay allows me, for the first time, to academically investigate **to what extent did western aggression transform China's diplomacy between 1842-1864?** Often, the opening and modernization of China are discussed as a whole and specific topics are not focused on. Therefore, this essay intends to shed light on the history behind China's diplomatic practices.

In the 19th century, the Imperial Qing Dynasty² slowly declined due to external and internal pressures.³ The western powers forced their way into Chinese territories with superior gunboats in the First Opium War 1839-1842 and obliged the Qing to establish diplomatic relations.⁴ Yet, the Qing adhered to its traditional mode of Chinese diplomacy, the tributary system⁵, for almost two decades to deal with foreign aggression.⁶ Major diplomatic modernization initiatives were initiated only after the Second Opium War 1856-1860.⁷ In a short time (1861-1864), initiatives such as the establishment of the Zongli Yamen, Interpreters Schools and the adoption of international law led to a noticeable departure from the Qing's tributary system.⁸ The mainstream approach, John Fairbank's Impact-Response Model, cites western aggression as the immediate and direct

¹ Chesneaux, Jean, Marianne Bastid, Marie-Claire Begère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution* (Great Britain: The

² The ruling dynasty (1644-1911).

³ Zhang, Xiaomin and Xu Chunfeng, "The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation: Analysis from an Ideational Perspective," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* (2007): 405, accessed March 13, 2013, <http://cjjp.oxfordjournals.org/>.

⁴ Quan, Hexiu, "The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China: External Relationships, Modernization and Transitional Phase," *Journal of Northeast Asian History* (2008): 33, accessed August 16, 2013, http://contents.nahf.or.kr/files/pdf/jn/jn_007_0020.pdf.

⁵ Traditional Chinese diplomacy with peripheral states.

⁶ Craig, Albert, *The Heritage of Chinese Civilization Second Edition* (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2001), 133.

⁷ Quan, "The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China: External Relationships, Modernization and Transitional Phase," 33.

⁸ Hsü, Immanuel C.Y., *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 207.

? Need to provide page numbers for text sources.

The Introduction includes a clear research question and provides¹ historical context, though the actual significance/worthiness tends to be dealt with in reference to "personal interest" rather than being focussed on clearly explaining the historical significance of the topic. This "significance/worthiness" aspect could have been developed.

cause of the diplomatic transformation.⁹ However, this model neglects the impact of Taiping Rebellion 1850-1864, and the Qing's change of perspectives on its regime and interactions with the west that is asserted in Chen Shenglin's Challenge-Response Model.¹⁰ Many scholars, both western and Chinese, concluded that this phase of modernization was the "springboard" for China's entrance to international diplomacy.¹¹

Explanatory Models

When conducting historical research into China's late diplomatic transformations, one is likely to encounter a couple of explanatory models. American historians, John Fairbank and Joseph Levenson proposed the "Impact-Response Model" that argues western influence as the primary cause of China's rapid modernization, including diplomatic.¹² The assumptions of this model include: China's traditional and isolated society was impacted by western domination, she lacked the motive and strength to catch up with the western countries and she modernized only in response to direct foreign military aggression.¹³ The events of the investigated scope, the First Opium War 1839-1842 and Second Opium War 1856-1860, were examples of early physical confrontations between China and the West that drew the feudal society closer to that of the rapidly changing west. Historian Ssu-Yu Teng elaborated that for the first time, a more powerful empire with a more superior military confronted China and tied her to unequal treaties and forced foreign relations upon her. The western contact had a tremendous amount of impact in every aspect—"political, economic, social, ideological [and] cultural"—of the Chinese society.¹⁴ This model has become the main point of reference in historical research of the China's late foreign relations.¹⁵

It isn't necessary to write "historian" as a prelude to the naming of writers.

⁹ Zhang and Xu, "The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation," 406.

¹⁰ Ibid., 408.

¹¹ Quan, "The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China," 24.

¹² Fairbank later corrected the Impact-Response model and admitted that China's modernization resulted from internal Chinese dynamics with limited western influence.

¹³ Zhang and Xu, "The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation," 406.

¹⁴ Teng Ssu-Yu and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response To The West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923* (Canada: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1963), 1.

¹⁵ Ibid. 406

Regarding footnote 12, if this is to be considered an important point, it should be considered in the main body of the essay, and not relegated to a footnoted information reference.

In 1974, Historian Paul Cohen pointed out that the Impact-Response Model over-exaggerated the role of the west because all vocabulary, concepts and analytical frameworks of this topic are derived from western sources.¹⁶ Often, the lack of Chinese-produced sources and abundance of western perspectives tended to distort Chinese history by overstressing the impact of foreign aggression.¹⁷ Cohen inspired a new analytic approach to modern Chinese studies where the focus is on internal dynamics. Chinese researcher, Chen explained by suggesting another model, the “Challenge-Reaction Model.”¹⁸ He believes that the two Opium Wars posed a dual challenge of an “invading west” and a “technologically advanced West.”¹⁹ The Qing responded to the challenges with three different policies: isolation, submission and resistance and learning.²⁰ The latter is used to describe the Qing’s intellectual responses after the defeat of the Opium Wars: the Qing reacted by self-strengthening through political and diplomatic modernization by learning from the west in order to resist prospective western aggression. The Challenge-Reaction model is the analytical framework of this investigation. Internal elements such as the recognition of the new international environment and the influence of the civil war will be explored in order to see the whole picture and reach a holistic conclusion.

Traditional Chinese Diplomacy

Understanding the reasons behind the Chinese perception of foreigners and the outside world is crucial in determining the reasons behind diplomatic modernization of the late 19th century. China was one of the foremost countries in East Asia from the Han and Tang Dynasties through to the “Kang-Yong-Qian” Golden Era.²¹ Overtime, she fostered a sense of political, military, economic and cultural superiority. The geographical barriers and traditional mode of transportation limited interactions between China and advancing western civilizations. Consequently, the Chinese civilization

¹⁶ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 407.

¹⁷ Cohen, Paul A, “Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past,” 180. .

¹⁸ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 408.

¹⁹ Ibid., 408.

²⁰ Ibid. page number missing

²¹ Ibid., 412. Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang Dynastic (618-907) are the two strongest and oldest dynasties in China. The “Kang-Yong-Qian” refers to Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, three most respected Qing emperors (1644-1796).

became isolated and developed a Sino-centric worldview.²² From the Chinese perspective, the world was East Asia and Chinese Emperor sat in the center. Chinese empires for centuries refused to perceive westerners as foreign nationals, instead as “tributary states” and “mutual trading states” that were inferior.²³ The rulers often described the West arrogantly as “insignificant”, “small” and referred to them as “barbarians.”²⁴ Before 1830, Chinese imperial authorities imposed a stern closed-door policy towards the west.²⁵ Those whom wished to interact with China must accepted its tributary status and recognize the Emperor’s supremacy by performing rituals such as the “kowtow.”²⁶ The ruling house of China at the time was the Manchus; it also preserved these traditional outlook and policies.²⁷ The Qing cleaved onto this tributary system of international relations when the West intruded into East Asia: “all lands are subject to us; we have no diplomacy; only tributary affairs.”²⁸ There were no institutions or officials that were responsible for foreign affairs.²⁹ The West, which sought direct communication with the Qing as equal political entities, was not accustomed to the Chinese method of diplomacy; it was limited and a delayed hierarchical process. From the very beginning, there loomed inevitable quarrels between the Qing and the West.

Who stated this?
When and in what context?

Possible better to avoid the use of "inevitable" in History essays - few things are inevitable.

First Opium War

In November 1839, Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu destroyed over 20, 000 chests of opium belonging to British merchants and sparked the first physical confrontation between China and Britain.³⁰ The Qing speedily concluded and reluctantly accepted the Treaty of Nanjing 1842 after being defeated in the war.³¹ The Nanjing Treaty-the first of the unequal treaties- to many was a British instrument of imperialism.³²

²² Ibid., 412.

²³ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 416.

²⁴ Hu, Seng, *From The Opium War To The May Fourth Movement Volume I*, trans. Li Dun J. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), 29.

²⁵ Chesneaux, Bastid and Begère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution*, 49.

²⁶ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 131. Three kneeling and nine knockings of the forehead on the ground.

²⁷ Wright, Mary Clabaugh, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (California US: Stanford University Press, 1962), 1.

²⁸ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 418.

²⁹ Hsü, Immanuel C.Y., *Readings In Modern Chinese History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 86.

³⁰ Craig, *The Heritage of Chinese Civilization Second Edition*, 133.

³¹ Gray, Jack, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition: China From the 1800s to 2000* (New York US: Oxford University Press Inc., 1990), 49.

³² Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 406.

However according to historian Jack Gray, the statement is difficult to sustain. He believes the clauses of the Nanjing Treaty were made as compensations for British lost of the war and a means of communication between the Qing and the British.³³ Britain could have forced the Qing to accept more extreme terms that were regarded normal under Western international law, but she limited her demands to the absolute minimum to secure future economic and diplomatic relations with China.³⁴ Nevertheless, the terms of the treaty pushed the Qing out of tributary affairs and into treaty relations and this represented a significant event in the transition of Chinese diplomacy. The Qing shortly concluded with United States the Wangxia Treaty and with France the Huangpu Treaty. Article 11 of the Nanjing treaty gave the British consul resident the right to communication, by writing, with any representatives of the Qing.³⁵ Second, Article 31 of the Sino-American treaty required for a special envoy in Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian and Zhejiang that was responsible for diplomatic affairs with western powers.³⁶ Lastly, Article 34 of Huangpu Treaty stipulated that trade envoys of the five trade ports or governor-generals in trading provinces ^(here being) ~~to~~ be responsible for diplomatic affairs.³⁷ As a result, these terms forced new institutional arrangements on the Qing. The post of trade envoys or governor-generals of the five trade ports was created to be in charge of treaty diplomacy and held a position equivalent to a minister of foreign affairs.³⁸ The Western powers had inaugurated the Qing towards a western model of diplomacy by dealing with western powers exclusively under treaty terms. The institutional changes in deference to the western demands at the time were an intermediate progress from the tributary system to modern diplomacy.

Furthermore, this war demonstrated the military inferiority of the Qing after failing to resist aggression. Even the beginning of the war in 1840, Admiral Sir George Elliot led a fleet that consisted of “48 ships-16 warships mounting 540 guns, four armed steamers, 27 transports, and a troop ship [with 4,000 men]”.³⁹ Many court officials

³³ Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 49.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Quan, “The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China,” 33.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid. // **Ibid, same page?**

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Perdue, Peter C, “The First Opium War: The Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842,” *Massachusetts Institute of Technology* (2010): 35,

This is not listed in the bibliography.

Is there evidence to support this claim?

recognized western military superiority however kept quiet about military modernization due to the disapproval from the court.⁴⁰ Commissioner Lin, known for his intransigent and consistent action against westernization and nicknamed “Blue Sky” for he was said to be “pure” and “unblemished” like a cloudless sky⁴¹, wrote a confidential letter in 1842 to his friend favoring military modernization: “unless we have weapons, what other help can we get to drive the crocodile and to get rid of the whales.”⁴² In addition, Lin had proposed to translate western books, to select Chinese personnel and more; all of his suggestions forecasted the main line of China’s developments of the self-renovation movement.⁴³ The First Opium War changed the outlook of some stern conservative Chinese scholars including Commissioner Lin. The realization of the need to modernize was being talked about among Chinese scholars and thus, proved that the idea of modernization was planted well ahead of the self-renovation movement twenty years later. It was the strict opposition of the court that delayed ideas of modernization from being carried forth.

This "strict opposition" needs to be evidenced/developed.

Second Opium War

The tension between the Qing and the West stirred up during the interwar period was a result of ineffective provisions of the treaties and evasions of negotiations signed. Foreign trade had not improved as much as the western powers had expected, opium trade was still banned, the number of ports was limited and most importantly, neither foreign diplomats nor foreigners could access Beijing.⁴⁴ The Qing saw the treaties as a “protective wall” for the Chinese government rather than a medium of communication.⁴⁵ The West was convinced that a “diplomatic opening” of China was necessary for “commercial opening” of China.⁴⁶ The French and the Americans also joined Britain in

accessed September 29, 2013, http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay.pdf.

⁴⁰ Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response To The West*, 28.

⁴¹ Hanes, W. Travis, PH.D and Frank Sanello, *The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another* (Illinois US: Sourcebooks Inc., 2002), 37.

⁴² Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response To The West*, 29.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴⁴ Chesneaux, Bastid and Begère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution*, 96.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁴⁶ Hsiü, Immanuel C.Y., *Readings In Modern Chinese History*, 88.

Specific details?

These points could be better detailed and developed.

What demands were these?

the Second Opium War of 1856-1860.⁴⁷ In the initial stages of the war, the Qing refused to grant any of the demands of western powers.⁴⁸ Lord Earl of Elgin, British envoy to China, was especially “obsessed” with the concession of a permanent ambassador in Beijing, threatened to march into Beijing if his terms were not met.⁴⁹ Knowing that Britain had a stronger army with advanced military equipment, Elgin and his subordinates threatened, bullied and insulted Chinese negotiators. Historian Immanuel Hsü claimed that with a “knife at their [(Chinese negotiators Kuei-liang and Hua-sha-na)] throats,”⁵⁰ the Chinese negotiators concluded the Treaty of Tianjin and ended the first phase of the war in 1858.⁵¹ Consequently, foreign ambassadors were allowed in the capital. This marked a blow to the valued tribute system and denied the superiority of the empire.⁵² The conclusion of the Tianjin Treaty guaranteed a British envoy to Beijing, a position almost equivalent to a foreign ambassador. Jurisprudence writer R. R. Foulke recognizes although inevitable in international living, he condemns mandatory diplomatic relations as “a plain act of aggression” and an “ugly phenomenon of imperialism.”⁵³ According to historian Quan Hexiu, modern diplomacy truly started after the first phase of the Second World because the recognition of a British envoy represented an “irreversible trend” in Chinese diplomacy; it would continue to westernize.⁵⁴

Evidence?

The level of expression here is awkward.

Why did they renew?

Hostilities renewed in the 1860s, and Anglo-French forces marched into Beijing and drove the Emperor to Manchuria, burnt down the Summer Palace and claimed to replace the Manchu dynasty with the Han ethnic group on 1 August 1860.⁵⁵ Again, western forces left the Qing no alternatives but to accept the demands of the Convention of Peking 1860 and directly communicate with the West. This difference of this conflict from the First Opium War was that it was fought in the capital. The Qing could no longer ignore the presence of western threat. This cataclysmic event forced the Qing to analyze and examine the situation it currently faced.

The dynasty - or advisors - or both? Provide specific detail.

⁴⁷ Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 90.

⁴⁸ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 207.

⁴⁹ Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 92.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁵¹ Hanes, and Sanello, *The Opium Wars*, 222.

⁵² Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 91.

⁵³ Hsü, *Readings In Modern Chinese History*, 153.

⁵⁴ Quan, “The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China,” 37.

⁵⁵ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 215.

Self-Renovation Period, 1861-1864

The defeat of the First Opium War humiliated the Qing. The Qing hoped that Britain would leave China alone if it obliged the treaty terms.⁵⁶ As a result, the Qing entered a period of inertia and avoided all unnecessary contact with the West.⁵⁷ It was not until the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing in the Second Opium War that profoundly impacted the Qing's methods of dealing with foreign powers.⁵⁸ Faced with constant western military pressure to establish diplomatic presence in its capital, the Qing had no options but to agree to series of bureaucratic changes that swayed the court from traditional statecraft. In addition to the institutional changes that were made in response to the treaty terms, the initiatives below were also major advances in China's diplomatic modernization development. On 20 January 1861, the Office for the Management of the Business of All Foreign Countries, known as the Zongli Yamen was established.⁵⁹ Originally, the Zongli Yamen was responsible for trade relations, but it became the principal office of all "western affairs" and acted as China's first foreign affairs office.⁶⁰ The second major establishment was the Interpreters College or College of Foreign Languages in 1862.⁶¹ At first, it was created in response to the Tianjin Treaty clauses that specified English and French texts of treaties as the authentic versions. The Qing needed to train Chinese individuals to be language experts and negotiate with foreign power.⁶² In 1864, the Qing adopted the principles, regulations and rules of international law and they formed the template of the Qing's diplomatic modernization process.⁶³ Prince Gong, a senior minister of the Zongli Yamen, published three hundred copies of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* and encouraged provincial officials to use it when dealing with foreigners.⁶⁴ Consequently, the concept of international law prompted the concept of national sovereignty. By international law, "independent states, no matter big or small,

⁵⁶ Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 51.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 页? page?

⁵⁸ Fairbank, John K. and Liu Kwang-Ching, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 1* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 491.

⁵⁹ Spence, Jonathan D., *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton and Company, 1990), 199.

⁶⁰ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10*, 505.

⁶¹ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 270.

⁶² Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10*, 505.

⁶³ Zhang and Xu, "The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation," 430.

⁶⁴ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 202.

Is there any way of knowing whether this concept was widely accepted by the dynasty or the majority of "provincial officials"?

are all equal.”⁶⁵ This concept was new to the Qing and was completely different from the traditional Chinese outlook of China as the middle kingdom and all states were subjects to her. The quick tempo of all the modernization initiatives after the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing led many to believe they were direct results of western aggression. Others argue that it was a prompt adaptation of the “capitalistic system of diplomacy.”⁶⁶ The Qing was not obliged by treaty terms to launch these modernization initiatives. An office that dealt with western powers, a school that taught foreign languages and the publication of *Elements of International Law* were examples of the Qing’s adaptation to the new environment.

Change in External Outlook

Although there is support for the Impact-Response model that argues western influence as the primary cause of China’s rapid diplomatic modernization, it contains several limitations. This model was made early in the 20th century before many Chinese sources were made available.⁶⁷ In addition, only individuals of ruling class and distinguished families were aware of foreign intrusion and the humiliation of China. Commoners, especially those who foreigners employed, did not record their views and experiences. Hence when examining Chinese perception of foreigners, one is limited to the primary sources from scholars who were deeply rooted in traditional teachings or foreigners who resided in China during the conflict.⁶⁸

unlikely claim.

When more Chinese sources were considered, there was more evidence that supported the Challenge-Reaction; the realization of the changed situation accelerated the diplomatic modernization of self-renovation period.⁶⁹ The idea of modernization was talked quietly among scholars but the court suppressed it after the First Opium War.⁷⁰

Such as?

For example, the political atmosphere in the capital was so impartial that there were signs not really the correct term "impartial".

⁶⁵ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 432.

⁶⁶ Quan, “The Two Systems of Diplomacy of Late Qing China,” 40.

⁶⁷ Cohen, Paul A, “Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past,” *America: Sage Publications Inc.* (1985): 180, accessed August 11, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1045348>.

⁶⁸ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume II: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 142.

⁶⁹ Zhang and Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” 408.

⁷⁰ Teng and Fairbank, *China’s Response To The West*, 28.

Which scholars in particular?

in restaurants saying: "Don't talk about current affairs."⁷¹ The situation after the Second Opium War however alarmed the Qing into the recognition of a changed situation.⁷²

Provide details.

Many scholars and officials, cognizant of the political situation the Qing faced, began to openly write and encourage modernization and by 1961, over 22 works on this theme had been written.⁷³ In addition, Prince Gong who emerged as a prominent leader at Beijing after he was left alone to deal with the invading west played a vital role in shaping the new perception of foreigners.⁷⁴ In a memorial submitted by Prince Gong to the Emperor on 13 January 1861, he stated that the foreign troops returned to Tianjin as soon as the exchange of the treaties and this demonstrated that foreign interest was not in Chinese land or people.⁷⁵ He believed that western powers' "sole interest was profit [from trade]."⁷⁶ Moreover, it was unquestionable that western weaponry was far more superior compared to the Chinese military. The West also offered to help the Qing modernize its military in a western fashion.⁷⁷ From Prince Gong's dealings with the West, He was convinced that in order for peace to reign, the Qing should oblige to the treaty terms and treat foreigners with good will and respect.⁷⁸ The treaties that were formally seen as, shame became useful instruments to limit foreign activities. This change of foreign outlook evolved a new policy: diplomatically accommodate the western powers to gain a period of peace in which the Qing ^{could} ~~can~~ strengthen, by learning from the West.⁷⁹ Thus the government put more emphasis maintaining peace through diplomacy while self-strengthening was the ultimate goal. The perspective change had changed the "closed door" policy in the forties to the "good faith" policy that was based on Confucian principles of honesty and sincerity.⁸⁰ The policy led to periods of peace and cooperation on both parties, thus provided a good environment for the Qing's rapid diplomatic reforms.

Explain why this was the case.

This reference to "good faith" policy and the Confucian principles deserve more explanation.

⁷¹ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 202.

⁷² Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume II*, 156.

⁷³ Zhang and Xu, "The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation," 421.

⁷⁴ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 266.

⁷⁵ Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response To The West*, 47.

⁷⁶ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10*, 492.

⁷⁷ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*. 295.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 267.

⁷⁹ Ibid. (11)

⁸⁰ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume II*, 199.

page?

Internal Pressure

^ The latter half of the 19th century the Qing regime was weakened by internal rebellions.⁸¹ Constant flooding and famine were widespread in China and made riots and rebellions likely.⁸² The most devastating one was the Taiping Rebellion led by Hong Xiuquan, a man who was clearly mentally ill.⁸³ The rebellion attacked not only the Manchu dynasty but also traditional social order.⁸⁴ The rebellion raged from 1850 to 1864 and it is known as the “most devastating civil war in history;” it claimed about twenty to thirty million lives.⁸⁵ Aside from the Taiping Rebellion, there were also numerous localized movements against the Qing regime.⁸⁶ By 1960, the Qing regime was on the verge of collapse because of the Anglo-French invasion and the insurrection of most resourceful provinces.⁸⁷ Confronted by both external and internal pressure that endangered the imperial regime, the Qing sought every opportunity to survive and re-established order. However, the coercion of western military and the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing were marginal disasters compared to the rebellions and uprisings that had plagued over major provinces throughout the 19th century.⁸⁸ Although generally the Qing refused direct foreign assistance, it was pleased when the foreign consuls expressed interest to help “to exterminate the rebels [Taiping rebels],”⁸⁹ The rebels were seen as the primary threat to foreign trade.⁹⁰ At first, the British observed neutrality, but in actuality, the British seized the opportunity for their own benefits. In a letter dated June 16, 1861, British Minister Bruce addressed to Admiral Hope stated: “an indifferent attitude between the two parties (Qing and the Taiping), the more inclined they will be to bid higher for our friendship and support.”⁹¹ The Qing sought every opportunity to acquire modern weapons to suppress the Taiping rebels and to bid for diplomatic

⁸¹ Chesneaux, Bastid and Begère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution*, 118.

⁸² Fairbank, John King and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 206.

⁸³ Michael, Franz, *The Taiping Rebellion* (US: University of Washington Press, 1972), 3.

⁸⁴ Ibid. **page?**

⁸⁵ Meyer-Fong, Tobie, *What Remains: Coming To Terms With Civil War In 19th Century China* (California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 1.

⁸⁶ Chesneaux, Bastid and Begère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution*, 118. (See Appendix 1 on page 17)

⁸⁷ Ibid., 129.

⁸⁸ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 9.

⁸⁹ Hu, *From The Opium War To The May Fourth Movement Volume I*, 216.

⁹⁰ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10*, 301.

⁹¹ Hu, *From The Opium War To The May Fourth Movement Volume I*, 302.

relations with Britain.⁹² Prince Gong justified his support for foreign assistance: “if we do not make them our allies they may be used by the rebels.”⁹³ The informal British-Qing entente took shape as Britain wanted stability for trade and Beijing wanted gunboats to defeat the Taiping.⁹⁴ As a result, foreign powers intervened in the following methods: (foreign involvement in the civil war included) direct intervention of foreign troops, provision of western arms and training and supplying of foreign officers.⁹⁵ The Qing could not westernize its military without some degree of westernizing its policies to please the British.⁹⁶ This period of rich diplomatic relations nevertheless won foreign recognition and assistance. As a result of good communication between the Qing and the West, China’s diplomacy advanced. Develop.

Good - or "mutually beneficial" which is possibly a little different. Worth developing.

Conclusion

1842-1864 was a period of change for the Qing’s foreign policy. The defeat of the Opium Wars fundamentally transformed China’s relation with western powers. The tributary system that Chinese Empires inherited was rapidly undermined when the commercial West made contact with China. While some may have immediately explained the reasons behind diplomatic modernization using the Impact-Response model, the model is flawed because it does not consider internal dynamics that the Challenge-Reaction model highlights. In 1842, the Qing was forced into treaty diplomacy after the defeat of the first Sino-British confrontation. The institutional changes ordered by the Nanjing Treaty and a series of other treaties made with Western powers led to a departure from the traditional tributary system. Moreover, the military and diplomatic aggressions of the Second Opium War imposed more demands to the Qing. Develop. Modernization initiatives of the self-renovation movement such as the Zongli Yamen, Interpreters Schools and the recognition of international law were almost immediately established after the conclusion of the Convention of Peking 1860. The rapid

⁹² Gray, *Rebellions and Revolutions Second Edition*, 100.

⁹³ Gregory, John S, “British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* (1959): 18, accessed August 28, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2943446>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Fairbank and Liu, *The Cambridge History of China Volume 10*, 304.

⁹⁶ Hsü, *Readings In Modern Chinese History*, 136.

transformations led many people to assume that the Anglo-French occupation of Beijing as the only factor in the modernization of Chinese diplomacy. However, this neglects the impact of the Qing's recognition of the international situation in 1860 on the court's policies: to strengthen by learning western methods and inaugurating modernizing initiatives. Also, this disregards the turmoil of the Taiping Rebellion and other local uprisings and how they contributed to the Qing's attitude towards the West: to seek every opportunity to buy foreign weapons and suppress the rebellions. Although Western aggression is undeniably significant in transforming the Qing's diplomacy, it was merely a catalyst. Internal dynamics especially the recognition of China's position in the international stage and the threat from the series of rebellions all imply that the tottering Qing government was aware of its serious need for strengthening and opening policies. In many occasions, the Qing chose to modernize and was not legally forced to. Why were the diplomatic modernization initiatives delayed for almost twenty years after the First Opium War still remains ambiguous. This question, however, can form the basis for another investigation.

Has this effectively and convincingly evidenced in the essay?

consistent conclusion through the evidence regarding "challenge - reaction" model could have been better supported/substantiated. At times rather descriptive/narrative and in the need of more depth, but for the most part, readable and clearly expressed (though some awkward explanation at time which careful proofreading might have eliminated).

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There are some slight omissions in terms of sources in the bibliography (eg. Perdue) and page numbers are omitted in the footnoted references at times.

Appendices

Would be worthwhile highlighting which were after 1864 and which were before.

Appendix 1: Provisional List of Rebellions between 1860-1870

Province	1860-1870
Hunan	27
Hubei	7
Sichuan	2
Guizhou	--
Guangdong	--
Guangxi	--
Yunnan	--
Jiangxi	6
Fujian	1
Zhejiang	--
Jiangsu	1
Henan	2
Zhili	2
Gansu	1
Shandong	--

Is this taken from a source? Which? Chesneaux presumably (see footnote 86, page 11).

Appendices can prove useful in the EE but often are not well linked to the argument. Though this is referenced (p11) it is not particularly helpful to the argument since it doesn't give any indication which rebellions were carried out up to 1864 (the end-point of the essay's focus) and which came later.