

What are the prospects for positive peace between the Uighurs and the Chinese Government?

International Baccalaureate Extended Essay 2010

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Subject: Peace and Conflict Studies

Topic: The conflict between the Uighur people and the Chinese Government.

Research Question: What are the prospects for positive peace between the Uighurs and the Chinese Government?

“The paradox of civilizing projects is that they can, in some circumstances, turn back on themselves. With their avowed (and often sincere) intention to raise the cultural or civilizational level of the peripheral people, civilizers also make an implicit promise to grant equality, to share power, to give up ultimate control over how and when the subalterns speak. When the first happens without the second, when the peoples of the periphery gain advancement without equal empowerment, revolts can be the result.” Harrell, cited in Leung 2010

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Abstract:

This essay will explore the potential for Johann Galtung's positive peace between the Uighurs (pronounced *wee-gurs*) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After investigating the central issues and history behind the conflict, peace theories proposed by Johann Galtung and Dennis Sandole will be analysed in terms of the Sino-Uighur Conflict. From this, it will be determined that there is a possibility of positive peace between the Uighurs and the Chinese Government, though this will not be an instantaneous transformation and may occur at the expense of the Uighur culture.

The notion of aiming for positive peace is especially important because of the domestic nature of the Uighur-CCP conflict. If Uighur independence is not achieved, then all the ethnic groups in Xinjiang will need to reconcile and learn to coexist harmoniously. Positive peace creates the best conditions for such quotidian relations.

The most significant limitation to the conclusions of this essay lies in the reliability of the sources used. Whilst every care was taken to ensure a general consensus among Chinese, Uighur and Western sources, texts often undermined and contradicted one another. Due to the delicate nature of the conflict, nearly all information is imparted via the internet and press – few academic or deliberately impartial investigations have been undertaken. Despite my attempt at subduing any preconceptions of the two parties, a degree of subjectivity may have emerged which could have affected which

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sources I considered reliable, as well as the angle at which I approached the research question. What's more, the analysis of peace and conflict theories did not consider the full implications of the conflict – or of peace – on the other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. So while the conclusions in this essay are drawn from deep analysis and encompass a broad scope they are, to a degree, incomplete.

Word Count: 297

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Introduction:

In recent times, the north western Chinese province of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has been the site of escalating tensions between the Indigenous East Turkestan People, or Uighurs, and the Chinese Government. Uighurs assert that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is orchestrating a “cultural genocide” (Dilyar, 2010) whilst China maintains that it is promoting “ethnic unity” and a stable society (*Ethnic unity key to continued progress*, 2009e). Through analysis of peace theories proposed by Johann Galtung and Dennis Sandole, this essay will explore the prospects for positive peace¹ between the Uighurs and CCP.

The echoes of this issue, whilst predominantly contained to Xinjiang, have reverberated across the world: the conflict first came to my attention when Melbourne’s 2009 International Film Festival was disrupted by the withdrawal of three Chinese films in protest to the inclusion of a documentary about the Uighur Rebiya Kadeer (Toy, 2009); in 2001, suspicions of links with terrorism, Al Qaeda and September 11 resulted in seventeen Uighur men being imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay – most of whom have now been released (Richey, 2010); twenty Uighur men, women and children seeking asylum in Cambodia underwent forced repatriation to China earlier this year (Moore, 2009). Despite these moments in the global spotlight, the Uighur-CCP conflict

¹ “Positive peace is more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law.” (Galtung, cited in *Johann Galtung*, 2006)

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is often overshadowed by the situation in neighbouring Tibet, or myopically brushed aside by the West because “we see Muslims somewhere who are unhappy, and maybe even violent, and we assume it’s because of religious reasons” (Millward, cited in Drake et al., 2009, pp47).

The People’s Republic of China is becoming more and more influential in today’s political climate. An awareness of the state’s orientation towards domestic conflicts is vital to present and future co-operations with this increasingly prominent country. After exploring the causes and conditions of the conflict, I will use Galtung’s *diagnosis-prognosis-therapy* triangle and Sandole’s Three Pillar Approach as a framework to demonstrate that positive peace between the Uighurs and the CCP is achievable.

Background Information:

The Uighurs are one of the 55 ethnic minority groups in China with a population, according to the 2000 Chinese census, of just under 9 million (Gladney, 2003). They are distinct from other ethnic groups not only in their history but also through their rich culture and the Turkic language they share (Luh, 2006, pp89). Most Uighurs live in the north-western Chinese province of the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (Bhattacharji, 2009). To the Uighurs, this land is known as either Uighurstan or East Turkestan (Bhattacharji, 2009).

Historically, the precise information of who was politically powerful in Xinjiang during what era is disputed. Since the hustle and bustle of the fabled Silk Road thousands of years ago, the region has always been an intersection of people from many backgrounds, cultures and nationalities (*The Silk Road: History*, 2009f). It is believed that Uighurs settled in Xinjiang after the fall of the formidable Uighur Khanate (Appendix A) in 840 CE (Gladney, 2003), though the World Uyghur Congress states that Uighurs have a history of around 4000 years in the region (*Brief History of East Turkestan*, 2009a). In 1759 under the Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1911) the land was officially recognised as under Chinese jurisdiction, though the Chinese Communist Party argues that the “Western Region” has been an integral part of the motherland since the Western Han Dynasty (206BCE – 34CE) (*Xinjiang, multi-ethnic region since ancient times: white paper*, 2003). Xinjiang has also intermittently been controlled by Tibetans, Russians, Mongols, alliances of Turkic tribes and some short-lived independent rulers (*Xinjiang, multi-ethnic region since*

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ancient times: white paper, 2003). In fact, the earliest mummies from circa 1800BCE found in Xinjiang were “exclusively Europoid or Caucasoid” (Mair, cited in Coonan 2006), which proves just how diverse the people and history of this region are. Today, there are officially 47 ethnic groups represented in Xinjiang with a total population of around 20 million (*Brief Introduction*, 2009b).

The XUAR covers 1/6th of China’s territory and is geographically both fruitful and strategic. It borders with Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and one of China’s other trouble spots, Tibet. This inevitably makes Xinjiang act as a “buffer” and become China’s gateway to Asia (Drake et al., 2009, pp39). The resources hidden beneath the deserts and mountains of this area account for 40% of China’s coal reserves, 21% of China’s gas reserves and 17% of China’s oil reserves (Drake et al., 2009, pp43). For a country developing as quickly as China, pulling billions of people out of poverty, this land is priceless.

Figure 1: Map of Xinjiang and surrounding regions (Xinjiang, 2010b)



Current Situation:

In July 2009, Urumqi (the capital of XUAR) was rocked with the worst violence in China since Tiananmen Square (1989) with an official toll of 197 both Han and Uighur deaths (*Death toll of Urumqi riots rises to 197*, 2009d), though Uighur sources suggest a figure closer to 1000 (*The Urumqi Massacre*, 2009g). The protests began peacefully on July 5, as Uighurs took to the streets condemning the murders of two Uighur factory workers in the southern province of Guangdong (Bequelin, 2009). Somehow (sources disagree as to whether it was caused by police shooting or Uighur-incited) a transformation occurred and the city became filled with mayhem – vehicles torched, shops destroyed, murder. According to BBC News (*Timeline: Xinjiang Unrest*, 2009h), three days of unrest followed as Han Chinese attempted revenge and then Uighur women filled the city demanding the release of their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers – up to 5000 Uighur men went missing on the first night of the riots, according to the World Uyghur Congress (*The Urumqi Massacre*, 2009g). Human Rights Watch has recorded a more moderate figure of 43 recorded disappearances (*We are afraid to even look for them*, 2009j). The violence dissipated on July 9, when thousands of Chinese troops took control of the city (*Timeline: Xinjiang Unrest*, 2009h). Chinese officials blame the exiled ex-political prisoner and “mother of all Uighurs” Rebiya Kadeer for instigating the hostilities, but as yet there is no evidence to support this claim (Drake et al., 2009, pp54). So far, at least 26 people (their ethnicity is unclear) have been sentenced to death for their role in the July riots (Mamatjan, 2010).

Since Xinjiang came under the control of China in 1949, ending the fleeting Second Republic of East Turkestan, barely a year has gone by without reports of restiveness and protests – the 1990s were particularly riddled with news of Uighur uprisings (Bequelin, 2009). So what is the source of the discontentment? Among the Uighurs' concerns include the restriction of the Uighur language, lack of religious freedom including the prohibition of under 18s and government officials in mosques, the demolition of the Old City section of Kashgar where generations of Uighurs have lived, difficulties obtaining passports, unjust detention, arrests, violence and imprisonment by Chinese authorities, employment discrimination, false information released by the Chinese government and the generalisation that Uighurs, through their Islamic faith, are terrorists. This latter point is partially warranted in the sense that there are connections between individual Uighurs and extremist organisations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. However, no more than a few Uighurs have ever been proven to be terrorists and China “uses the connection to justify continued repression of the Uighurs” (Eranosian, 2005, pp13). It would be difficult to justify the credibility of these accusations with solely Uighur sources, but all these claims are supported by reports from the organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (*Uighur ethnic identity under threat in China*, 2009i; *We are afraid to even look for them*, 2009j).

The CCP's primary response to these allegations is denial, however some explanations are provided. For example, the demolition of the Old City section

of Kashgar which has stood for 2000 years is explained by the buildings' vulnerability to earthquakes (Drake et al., 2009, pp50). The prohibition of people under 18 years old to enter mosques is enforced as they are believed not mature enough to have good judgement and should be studying at school, rather than practising a religion (Chung et al., 2009; Eranosian, 2005).

Exacerbating the tensions is the widening chasm between the Uighur people and Han Chinese (the largest ethnic group in China). As part of the government's attempt to assimilate Xinjiang into China, millions of Han were encouraged to migrate to the region in the 1950s and 60s (Appendix B) (Bequelin, 2009). Now a certain amount of resentment has built up among Han as they perceive minorities to be treated preferentially – they are exempt from the one child policy, some say Uighurs with “disciplinary problems or criminal offences are treated leniently”, and still others claim there are cases of “reverse discrimination” when applying to universities (Chung et al., 2009). Unfortunately, a large proportion of Han explain the comparative poverty of Uighurs as the result of their inherent laziness – as if it is a cultural characteristic (Chung et al., comments, 2009; Mozur, comments, 2009). Nancy Eranosian (2005, pp48) writes that Han Chinese are “arrogant and condescending towards ethnic minorities, and consider traditional cultures feudal by their very being”. These feelings make it difficult for Han to understand the Uighur's grievances.

The question of separatism invariably arises, and it is one of the more sensitive issues of this conflict. From China's perspective, the land of Xinjiang

is irreplaceable as a buffer zone and for its resources (Drake et al., pp39). Furthermore, the Communist and Confucian ideology which is embedded so deeply in Chinese society rejects the idea of secession; the Chinese constitution does not include the right to secede and Article 13 of Criminal Law even criminalises separatist actions (*Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China*, 1997). Uighurs, on the other hand, yearn for their “Uighur Nation” (Drake et al., 2009, pp55). They maintain that China is occupying East Turkestan – the land that is rightfully theirs (Kadeer, 2009, pp390). All the same, it is clear that the Uighur’s priority is, to begin with, the reinstatement of their rights – “the rest will develop outwardly from respect for human rights” (Kadeer, 2009, pp390).

As the Uighurs continue to resist China’s image of “national unity” (Eranosian, 2005, pp1), new laws are being put in place to teach “ethnic unity” in schools in Xinjiang (Xinhua, 2009). These laws “will promote equality, unity and harmony in Xinjiang and serve its long-term stability” (Xinhua, 2009). In April 2010, the long time Party boss of the XUAR Wang Lequan was removed from his post and replaced by the “relative liberal” (Garnaut, 2010b), Zhang Chunxian. A month later, ten months after the initial clamp down, full internet service was restored to the region. Then, from May 17-19th at the first ever Xinjiang Work Conference new goals for the region were discussed with a focus specifically on economic improvement. Overall, “By 2015, its per-capita GDP should catch up with the country's average level and residents' incomes and access to basic public services should reach the average level of China's western regions” (Shujun, 2010). These promising developments show a

certain willingness of the CCP to acknowledge and even attempt to solve some of the problems being faced in Xinjiang.


However, there are some concerns. The East Turkestan Association Australia is doubtful of the new policies' effectiveness at overcoming the unrest and tensions because "the region developed economically since the communist occupation, however, the uprisings and dissatisfaction never stopped" (Dilyar, 2010). Moreover, legalities in Xinjiang do not seem to always be followed through, as demonstrated by the laws accompanying the area's designation as an Autonomous Region which are supposed to enable rights such as "Right of Self-Government" and "Freedom of Religious Belief" (*Regional autonomy for ethnic minorities in China*, 2005). If anything, this label has enabled China a tighter control of Xinjiang rather than granting the province more independence (Tharoor, 2009).

Application of Peace and Conflict Theory:

In order to contemplate the prospects of peace between the Chinese Government and the Uighurs the theories behind peace, conflict and conflict management must be explored. The Peace theorists Johann Galtung and Dennis J.D. Sandole provide models through which conflict and peace can be examined and understood.

Galtung, often referred to as “the father of peace research” (Bordbar, 2010) creates a correlation between health studies and peace studies. In both areas of knowledge there is a common idea of “well states and ill states” (Galtung, 1996, pp1), and Galtung suggests that peace researchers and third parties should deal with violence in the same way a doctor might manage a disease. That is, in a triangular cycle of *diagnosis – prognosis – therapy*.

Figure 2: Galtung’s diagnosis-prognosis-therapy triangle (created by Katharine Gentry)



According to Galtung (Galtung, 1996, pp1), even seemingly well systems must undergo the *diagnosis* stage. This is because whilst the conditions and contexts for peace may be different from those for violence, they could be interlinked and related. Galtung emphasises that when diagnosing, “a narrow focus is doomed from the start” (Galtung, 1996, pp1). A peace researcher or third party must understand the conflict from a “transdisciplinary spectrum” (Galtung, 1996, pp1).

In the context of the Uighur-CCP issue, the unavoidable diagnosis is that of an unwell state. The considerable social and economic dissatisfaction from Uighurs, coupled with the recent outbreak of violence (not to mention the tensions and unrest that had been present for decades before) and the conflict of interests surrounding the future of Xinjiang and the Uighur culture are some factors which lead to this conclusion. It is likely that Galtung would further diagnose this conflict as one of *structural violence*: “situations of unfair access to political, economic, and other resources because of one’s involuntary membership in certain ethnic, religious, racial, and/or other groups” (Sandole, 1998).


Once a system is deemed unwell, a *prognosis* to determine whether it is in need of “other intervention” or is capable of “self restoration” should be undertaken (Galtung 1996, pp1). According to Galtung, unconscious self restoration is possible if positive conditions have been set in place within the system – it could simply “take care of itself” (Galtung, 1996, pp1). The likelihood that this may happen in Xinjiang is very low because the cultural,

financial and social divide between Han and Uighurs is so prevalent. Furthermore, the animosity Uighurs feel towards the Chinese Government for what they see as a “cultural genocide” (Dilyar, 2010) instils a lack of trust in the system. The system itself tends to react with a “lack of restraint” to “those who challenge them” (Leung, 2010). This condition within the system cannot be considered positive in the sense that whilst it may reduce conflict and fighting, it does so through force and intimidation. This approach does not solve any long term issues between the parties.

If unconscious self restoration is unlikely, Galtung (1996, pp1) recommends that “deliberate efforts by Self or Other to move the system back again toward some well-state”, or *therapy*, commences. In terms of what has already been attempted by the Chinese Government to return to this “well-state”, three main strategies have arisen: (sometimes violent) suppression, cultural assimilation and economic development in the XUAR. The first technique can be categorised as what Galtung (Galtung, 1996, pp1) calls “curative therapy” or “negative peace”, but stops short at becoming a “preventative therapy” leading to “positive peace”. Even so, curative therapy is often a preliminary step before preventative therapy. On the other hand, suppression and also assimilation are unfortunately closely related to the vicious cycle into which the conflict has fallen – Uighurs resist Chinese influence in some manner, so are victim to a new surge of laws or oppression, making them oppose the CCP more aggressively, leading to a harsher crackdown until the tensions escalate into a conflict like the July 2009 riots. This cycle is similar to Gaia

Peace Atlas' model of Civil Peacekeeping in which "an escalating see-saw of action and reaction is created" (Barnaby, 1988, pp64-5).

Figure 3: the Gaia Peace Atlas' model of Civil Peacekeeping (Barnaby, 1988, pp64-5)



The final, economically focused approach is more promising. Whilst there are some concerns as to wealth distribution and employment discrimination, eliminating poverty also reduces some of the “tremendous pressure for change” (Barnaby, 1988, pp64-5) which it stimulates. Still, the roots of the conflict are not addressed so social unrest may continue.

So far, the initiatives led by the “Self” have not succeeded in creating positive peace. Admittedly, the change in leadership of Xinjiang is a hopeful step forward, though Chunxian is yet to be truly tested. As for external intervention, no significant third party intervention in the Uighur-CCP conflict has occurred. It is important to remember that third party intervention may actually heighten the conflict, such as the USA’s intervention in the Vietnam War. Whilst China continues to deny the World Uyghur Congress’ wish for peaceful dialogue, any third party who forces peace talks may amplify tensions. Moreover, the domestic and civilian-focused nature of the conflict may deem third party intervention as intrusive and meddling and could consequently harm international relations. All the same, to reach beyond curative therapy towards preventative therapy third party intervention may be the only option.

Dennis Sandole provides a knowledge-based model which focuses on understanding and processing a conflict to “(implement) an effective intervention into it” (Sandole, 1998). He presents it as a “three pillar approach”, whereby each pillar focuses on a different aspect of peace and conflict theory.

Figure 4: Sandole's Three Pillar Approach (Sandole, 1998)

Pillar 2	Pillar 1	Pillar 3
<i>Conflict Causes and Conditions</i>	Conflict Latent (Pre-MCP) MCP/AMCP	<i>Conflict Intervention 3rd Party Objectives</i>
Individual Level	Parties	Conflict Prevention
Societal Level	Issues	Conflict Management
International Level	Objectives	Conflict Settlement
Global/Ecological Level	Means	Conflict Resolution
	C/CR Orientations	Conflict Transformation
	C/CR Environment	[Conflict Provention]
		3rd Party Approaches
		Competitive vs. Cooperative
		Negative vs. Positive Peace
		Track-1 vs. Track-2

Central to his model is the Conflict, Pillar 1. From here stems all knowledge about the parties, their interests in the conflict and their attitudes towards conflict resolution – much of which has already been investigated. The objectives of the parties, however, can be illuminated through Sandole's model. According to the Three Pillar Approach, the objective of the CCP can be defined as "status-quo maintaining", with an aim of stability via "balancing" or "hegemony" (Sandole, 1998). The Uighur objective, on the other hand, is described as "status-quo changing" (Sandole, 1998). Due to the converse nature of the two objectives, third party interventions are made particularly difficult as the goals are "zero-sum" or "win-lose" (Sandole, 1998).

Pillar 2 focuses on the causes and conditions of the conflict. Rather than approaching this in the "transdisciplinary" way of Galtung, Sandole suggests examining the causes and conditions on individual, societal, international and

global/ecological levels. The advantage of this is that the conflict is analysed on a truly human level, taking into account “the compelling thesis of complexity theory that ‘everything is connected to everything else’” (Sandole, 1998). This pillar reveals that most of the issues in the conflict rest on the societal level so this is clearly where a third party interventionist would need to target. It also clarifies the factors influencing the conflict outside of the societal level. For example, on the individual level, when the fact that Uighur leader-in-exile Kadeer is considered a terrorist by the CCP is seen in the context of solving the conflict, it can be understood that her presence may actually be hindering the process of peace. It is possible that as long as she aligns herself with Uighurs so outwardly, peaceful dialogue and cooperation with China may never commence.

Pillar 3 considers the possibilities of third party conflict intervention. The styles of conflict intervention include prevention, management, settlement, resolution and transformation. In the context of the Uighur-CCP conflict there is little purpose to conflict management as the conflict is largely contained to Xinjiang. Conflict settlement would also be of small use because physical violence breaks out only sporadically, and is currently being controlled. Therefore the stages of conflict prevention, resolution and transformation would apply most adeptly.

Prevention would mean inhibiting further violence, though a third party is not really needed for this: the CCP quenches uprisings and riots quite effectively through the strong military presence in Xinjiang, particularly since the July riots.

Conflict resolution deals with the underlying causes and conditions for the violence and uprisings. This would involve facing up to the points in Pillar 2 – cultural suppression, human rights violations, tensions between Han and Uighurs and the goal of ethnic unity to name a few. The laws surrounding Xinjiang’s designation as an Autonomous Region would need to be fully addressed in conflict resolution. This is important because it is entirely possible that “the establishment of these autonomous zones has created an artificial separation between races and locked in their differences” (Kuhn, 2009). The semblance of autonomy may actually be aggravating the conflict rather than creating a compromise. Furthermore, due to the imbalance of power between the parties it is necessary that the CCP recognises the benefits of peace in the XUAR during conflict resolution. For example, under conflict situations foreign investment in the region would be discouraged, there may be a more productive use of resources and harsh treatment of the Uighurs would bring criticism from humanitarian organisations and Muslim nations (possibly jeopardising a steady flow of energy resources) (Eranosian, 2005, pp52). Overall, Sandole (1998) suggests that in a “zero-sum” conflict such as this one, a third party must attempt to “reframe” the situation in order to find a resolution. This would involve finding an “integrative agreement” whereby each party gets what they “really” want– like Finland and Sweden’s agreement over the Aland Islands in the 1920s (Sandole, 1998). Once conflict resolution was implement, conflict transformation could begin and steps towards positive peace could be made. Unfortunately, conflict resolution is unlikely to happen at the current stage in the Sino-Uighur conflict because of China’s unwillingness to open dialogue (*China not willing to meet Kadeer*, 2009c).

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The theorists do not present an overly optimistic outcome for the conflict between the Uighurs and the Chinese Government. In any case, very little can be done by an external party, let alone by “self restoration” until both sides are willing to accept the full spectrum of the problem and be open to resolving it in a cooperative and peaceful manner. Under the current circumstances, this does not seem very likely to occur.

Prospects for Peace:

At this stage in the conflict, positive peace through peaceful means is unlikely to occur. This pathway to peace is hindered by China's refusal to open dialogue with the Uighurs. The global community and prospective third parties can encourage the CCP to cooperate over this matter, but very little progress can be made without their willing participation. If a breakthrough were to be made, Sandole's suggestion for a re-evaluation of each party's objectives would be of paramount importance. Nevertheless, it would be very difficult to come to an agreement. The Tibetans, despite having advocates from Hollywood "who are skilled in raising visibility for special causes" have regained neither autonomy nor full human rights (Eranosian, 2005, pp54). This evidence, along with the lack of dialogue between the two parties, makes positive peace through peaceful means an unlikely development.

All the same, positive peace between China and the Uighurs is not an unrealistic goal. The unbalanced nature of the power of the two parties means that the CCP is a formidable opponent to the Uighurs. If the conflict continues along its current path for a significant period of time, this imbalance will probably lead to peace – though most likely at the expense of the Uighur culture. Such a progression seems to have occurred in Inner Mongolia, where the ethnic people have been absorbed into the dominant Chinese culture with "little left remaining of their ethnic traditions except for 'theatre and museum pieces' that can be performed for tourists" (Eranosian, 2005, pp54-5). Eventually, this situation could lead to true, positive peace as well as China's ideal of "ethnic unity" (*Ethnic unity key to continued progress*, 2009e). All the same, this would be a "win-lose" or "zero-sum" outcome (Sandole, 1998).

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Both parties need to evolve beyond their current situation if there is to be any chance at a “win-win solution” (Wertheim, Littlefield and Love, 1995). As Galtung (1996 pp viii) acknowledges, in some cases “the parties have to be transformed so that the conflict is not reproduced forever”. There are some indications to suggest such a change is within the scope of the conflict. For instance, there was the change in leadership of the XUAR in May 2010. More drastically, the director of social issues at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Rural Affairs Professor Yu Jianrong has warned that China is on the brink of “revolutionary turmoil” (Jianrong, cited in Garnaut, 2010a). Strikes in June 2010 support the possibility of simmering social unrest in China (*Toyota is the latest car maker hit by strike in China*, 2010a). In the event that this somewhat surprising declaration came true, the current conditions of the conflict would be completely overturned.

Conclusion:

There are several possible pathways which the Uighur-CCP conflict could take towards positive peace. The conflict may continue along its current path. In this case, the imbalance of power between the two parties will, in all probability, result in the eventual success of the CCP over the Uighurs – a “zero-sum” outcome (Sandole, 1998). As with the ethnic people of Inner Mongolia, the *active* and *living* Uighur culture would suffer. In this scenario, it is likely that there will be a less dominant social divide between Uighurs and Han Chinese and many of the inequities currently experienced in Xinjiang will be levelled. Indeed, after time, Galtung’s positive peace could be achievable in the XUAR. As Galtung (1996, pp viii) notes that sometimes “the parties have to be transformed so that the conflict is not reproduced forever”, another potential path to peace in the Uighur-CCP conflict is revealed: through change. A “win-win solution” and positive peace may be feasible under these circumstances (Wertheim, Littlefield and Love, 1995). It is likely, however, that this change would only arrive after a huge upheaval which could involve more conflict. The prospect of peace through peaceful means, let alone with a third party, seems improbable because the CCP is not receptive to requests for dialogue. Overall, it is likely that peace in Xinjiang will only arrive after continued tension and possibly at the expense of the Uighur culture. In spite of this, positive peace between the Chinese Government and the Uighurs is within reach.

What are the prospects for positive peace between the Uighurs and the Chinese Government?

Appendix A:

Figure 5: Map of Uighur Empire c.800CE (Lessman, 2008)




Appendix B:

Figure 6: The populations of Han, Uighur and Kazakh in Xinjiang from 1941-2007

(Mason et al., 2009)

NEWCOMERS The population of Han Chinese in Xinjiang has swelled by 2.5 million since the 1990s, when Beijing's "Develop the West" initiative began a rush from the interior and the east coast. If the inflow continues, Han could soon outnumber Uygurs in their traditional homeland.



© Mason, Virginia W/National Geographic Stock

Appendix C

Email from the East Turkestan Association Australia (Dilyar, 2010)

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Acknowledgments:

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mrs. Anne Bright for her wisdom and guidance. Many thanks also to my family, who have supported me unceasingly throughout this journey. Finally, I'd like to acknowledge all those who have sat and listened patiently as I lectured them about events in the seemingly far-off corner of the world, Xinjiang. I hope they will help spread knowledge of the conflict around the globe.